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Abstract
The present study constitutes one of the first attempts to establish the extent to which 
Russian military thought became westernized by the end of the eighteenth century. The 
task is an important one in light of Soviet and Russian scholarship that maintains that 
Russia developed a unique, different, and, some argue, superior way of war to the West. 
This work argues that Russian military thought was greatly influenced by the ‘military 
enlightenment’ of Europe, and that the ideas proposed by Russia’s foremost military 
theoreticians were not as novel as previously claimed. Therefore, the final intellectual 
product was more a continuation of, rather than a break with, Western practices and 
traditions of warfare. In this respect, the underlying theme of this thesis clashes with 
traditional Russian national military historical scholarship. 
The second major theme of this study is to challenge the pervasive but flawed and 
often simplified interpretation of the Russian army and its soldiers as undisciplined and 
uneducated barbarians. Contrary to these misleading views, the writings of Russian
theorists bring to light the concerns about discipline and education for the officers, 
personal hygiene and hospital care for the soldiers and Russian awareness of complex 
strategic theoretical issues. The humanitarianism and sophistication of early-modern 
Russian military thought thus becomes abundantly clear.
The scope of this work is inescapably restrictive, and the period that it examines, 
roughly from 1757 to 1800, has been consciously chosen to reflect the ideas of Russia’s 
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P R O L O G U E
“…a history of ancestors
is always interesting to those
who deserve a motherland.”
Karamzin, 18th century Russian historian
As the French Revolutionary Wars were furiously raging throughout the continent in the 
last decade of the eighteenth century, the Russian Emperor Paul I patiently watched the
political hurricane engulfing the monarchies of Western Europe. In 1799, while Napoleon 
embarked on a fruitless expedition to Egypt, Europe began preparing for another war on 
Republican France. Shocked by regicide, disgusted with French atheism, encouraged by 
his own diplomats1 and backed by British and Austrian courts, Paul joined the Second 
Coalition. In the winter of the same year, the Russian emperor sent Russian forces to help
the Hapsburgs clear Italy of the godless and maraudering French. Furthermore, on special 
request of the Austrian Emperor Francis, Paul recalled the most eccentric of his Field 
Marshals, Alexander Suvorov, from exile. Suvorov received his battle baptism in the last
years of the Seven Years’ War, and fought in four major wars against the Poles and the 
Turks. He made history by becoming one of the few military commanders to have never 
retreated, and as it is claimed, participated in “63 battles without suffering a single major 
defeat.”2 Suvorov fell out of favour after the death of Catherine the Great in 1796 and 
was banished from the court to spend the remainder of his days on one of his estates in 
                                                
    1 See for instance a very ably written MA thesis by Charles Patrick Crouch, “Russian Foreign Policy and 
the War of the Second Coalition: A Mad Attempt at Realpolitik?: Count Semen Romanovich Vorontsov 
and the ‘English Connection’” (MA Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1985), 80.
    2 Russell Isinger, “Aleksandr Suvorov: Count of Rymniksky and Prince of Italy.” Military History 
Magazine (1996). <http://www.historynet.com/aleksandr-suvorov-count-of-rymniksky-and-prince-of-
italy.htm> [26 December 2007]. The only time when Suvorov’s attack had failed was under the walls of 
Ochakov in 1788, when he reportedly consumed too many spirits. See Simon Sebag Montefiore, Prince of 
Princes: The Life of Potemkin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 405.
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the province of Novgorod. In 1799, a frail and aging Suvorov had celebrated his 69th
birthday.
Reinstated and made the supreme commander of the Austro-Russian forces, he 
was now on the way to catch up with his 50,000 strong army that was approaching Italy. 
Meanwhile, learning from their previous experience in fighting the Revolutionary sans-
culottes, the Austrians and the British were making massive preparations for the 
upcoming war. Plans were devised for several years of campaigning. No one could have 
predicted that the gnome-like Russian Field Marshal would defeat four French armies in 
less than six months. Suvorov crushed General Scherer near the river Adda and in April 
General Moreau suffered the same fate. In June he defeated General Macdonald on the 
banks of Trebbia and, in the Battle of Novi, General Joubert perished along with his 
army. Suvorov’s name thundered throughout Europe and The Times paid homage to the 
saviour of Europe.3 Suvorov was now sent to Switzerland to replicate what he had so 
swiftly done in Italy. The old man again made history by becoming the second military 
commander (after Hannibal) to march his army over the Alps in the teeth of dogged 
enemy resistance.4
Against this background in October 1799, the Russian Imperial Armies, 
commanded by the brilliant Suvorov (now promoted to the unprecedented rank of 
                                                
    3 See “Marshal Suworow's March From Italy,” The Times, Friday, Nov 29, 1799; pg. 3. and “Marshal 
Suworow,” The Times, Friday, Dec 20, 1799; pg. 4. And when he expired in 1800, The Times printed a
glorifying arbitrary - a rare honour for someone from Russia. “The world never lost a greater Captain than 
the late Field-Marshal Suworrow,” The Times, 1 August 1800, 2. Neither the all-powerful Potemkin nor the 
influential Rumyantsev enjoyed such flattering notice upon their death.
    4 Napoleon Bonaparte would make a similar journey in 1801, immortalized by Jacques-Louis David in 
“Napoleon Crossing the Alps.” The equivalently propagandistic painting of Suvorov was created by Vasily 
Surikov, “Russian Troops under Suvorov Crossing the Alps.”
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Generalissimo),5 found themselves scaling the steep Swiss Alps. As the Russians slowly 
made their way through the high mountain pass of St. Gotthard, the Second Coalition 
began to fall apart.6 Emperor Paul was so dissatisfied with the Austrians that as soon as 
Suvorov descended from the cloudy mountains on the other side, he was ordered to bring 
all Russian forces home. Tired and bitter, Suvorov had no choice but to obey. Behind he 
left the glory of his conquests in Italy, the mountain passes littered with dead French and 
Russian soldiers, and his hopes for renewed operations against France. 
As Suvorov was descending from the snowy peaks with the remnants of his 
exhausted army, there was something else that the Russians had left behind. Somewhere 
underneath the deep snow of the Alps, never to be found again, lay buried the “Golden 
Age” of the Russian art of war that heralded half a century of unprecedented geo-political 
expansion. In the period of less than fifty years, Russia had acquired a third of Poland, 
annexed the Crimea, consolidated its rule over the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus,
increased its influence in the Balkans and secured its place on the European international 
arena. All of the successes enjoyed by the young Romanov Empire were spearheaded as 
much by its diplomatic efforts as by the shining bayonets of her armies. In 1760 Berlin 
had capitulated to the invading Russians; Warsaw was captured in 1794; and five years 
later, the Russians liberated Milan from the French. During that time, a Russian soldier 
was a common sight to the people of Western Europe, who could see Russian Imperial 
Standards marching confidently through the European heartland. 
                                                
    5 So far, there have been only two people in Russian history to hold the rank of Generalissimo: the first 
was Suvorov; the last was Stalin.
   6 For the reasons of the failure of the Second Coalition see: Paul W. Schroeder, “The Collapse of the 
Second Coalition,” The Journal of Modern History 59, no. 2 (June, 1987): 245.
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The purpose of this study is to look beneath the surface of the violent sea of 
battles and campaigns that have dominated the period from the Seven Year’s War to the 
War of the Second Coalition. The aim of this work is to survey, document and quantify 
the Westernization of Russian military thought in the second half of the eighteenth
century and, where possible, to examine its character, trends and its failings and to put its 
assumptions within the greater contours of the European military landscape. Accordingly, 
this work posits that Russian military thought was defined by West-European influences 
and that the perceived variations were a response to necessity and practical demands
rather than evidence of distinct and original thought, doctrine, or way of war. This 
interpretation flies in the face of much of the Russian scholarship that has perpetuated the 
thesis of ‘Russian National Military Doctrine’, which maintains that the Russian way of 
war was both different and superior to the practices of the West.7 Even some Western 
historians, such as William Fuller, maintain that Russian thoughts about and practices of 
war were different enough to group them in a distinctive style of warfare.8
This thesis argues that Russian military thought was not autochthonous by nature.
That is not to say that the Russian understanding of war was either inferior or superior to 
that of France, England or Prussia. Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century Russian 
thought reached the same theoretical conclusions as were evident in the West. As it will 
be shown, in almost all of its principle tenants, Russian military thought was an extension
of, and not a break with, Western military traditions. From connecting war-making to 
politics, to seeking new tactical alternatives to linear battle formations, to examining 
                                                
    7 For instance, see A. A. Kersnovsky, Istoria russkoi armii, Vol. I (Moskva: Golos, 1992), 164-169. For 
nationalism in military affairs see Peter Von Wahlde, “Military Thought in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1966), 95.
    8 William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 166.
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morale and psychology of soldiers, and to the use of words in their writings, Russian 
theorists were advancing similar ideas and tracing the same intellectual path as their 
counterparts in the West. Therefore, a study based on a transitional rather than national 
model is better posed to assess material critically and to build an intellectual bridge 
between Russian and Western modes of military thought.
A more tangible goal of this work is to dissipate the image of barbarism in the 
Russian army purveyed in Western sources, often by the leading soldiers of the day. In 
the 1750s, Frederick the Great reflected the general European sentiments about the state 
of Russian military art. “The Muscovites are a heap of barbarians,” he was once heard 
saying. “Any well-disciplined troops will make short work of them.”9 Contemporaries 
saw the Russian army as undisciplined, unorganized and tactically inferior, and its 
soldiers as uncontrollable savages with a penchant for rape and destruction. This thesis 
supplies the modern reader (and the King of Prussia, although posthumously) with an 
alternative picture of the Russian armies in the early imperial period by revealing and 
assessing what Russian theorists wrote about discipline, training, medical care and 
sanitation in the army, and civil-military relations.10
To elucidate the conceptual origins of the notion of military thought, a few 
definitions are essential. All the branches of military science, on their most theoretical 
level, are subdivided into three distinct but inter-related categories, which in their genesis
are united under the rubric of military thought. For Peter von Wahlde, the term ‘military 
                                                
    9 Cited in Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military 
Power, 1700-1800 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 174.
    10 Despite the tantalizing presence of numerous examples in the realm of thought, this study readily 
recognizes the sometimes intolerable gap between the theory and practice. In many instances, rudimentary 
functions that were thoroughly and cogently covered in theory, received most contrite attention in practice 
and in some instances were neglected altogether.
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thought’ denotes the emergence of conscious, methodical, scientific and systematic 
process of approaching and solving problems related to war, peace and national 
security,11 while Storr defines it as “the conceptual component of fighting power.”12 This 
study adopts a broader definition of the term, and interprets military thought as the 
intellectual response of the military establishment to the phenomenon of war.
Before embarking on a journey into the depths of eighteenth century military 
minds, it would be useful to crystallize the theory behind the study of war. In the most 
simplistic form, the study of war consists of 
tactics, strategy, and doctrine respectively.
According to Carl von Clausewitz, tactics are a 
theory of employment of armed elements to win a 
battle, which ranks the lowest in the pyramid of 
military science (Figure 1). The study of tactics
usually preoccupies itself with the mundane 
details of combat and weapon systems on a limited scale within a relatively small 
geographic locality. Strategy, then, is a theory of employment of battles to win a war, or 
to achieve a specific objective in a conflict.13 It involves conducting long-term
campaigns, planning theatres of operations, and coordinating all the branches of the 
armed forces. In its scale, strategy engulfs the study of tactics and is therefore much 
broader in scope than the latter. Its goal is to execute the objects of national military 
doctrine, the last step on the ladder to war. Military doctrine serves to guide military 
strategy and to transform it into a national response to a military conflict, harmonizing
                                                
   11 The definition has been borrowed from Wahlde’s unpublished dissertation. Wahlde, viii.
   12 J. P. Storr, The Nature of Military Thought (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cranfield University, 2002), 3.
   13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 128.
Synthesis
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the efforts of economy and society with those of the military for the survival of the state. 
In the context of the above theoretical framework, military thought can be described as 
the sea of ideas from which multiple and diverse variables of military calculus can be 
extracted and tested against the rough exterior of wars. History, however, offers ample 
examples when states chose a doctrine that did not correspond to the thinking of their 
military leaders. One need only look at the labours of J. F. C. Fuller in England and 
Charles De Gaulle in the French Third Republic to see that military thought does not 
always lead to a doctrine. Their innovative and notable ideas about armoured warfare 
were largely ignored by their militaries and governments. This discrepancy forces some 
ideas to remain forever submerged and others to float confidently across the centuries. 
That being said, in the case of eighteenth century Russia, it is remarkable to observe how 
often the executioners of imperial will could align the military practice of the Russian 
army with their military thought.14
Historiography
This project was originally conceived amidst unsuccessful attempts to find sources on 
early modern Russian military thought for an undergraduate paper. Besides a few 
scattered references nothing of substance could be located. To the author’s knowledge,
there is still not a single monograph in the English or Russian language that traces the 
development of Russian military thought, theory or doctrine through the 18th century. 
One of the main goals of this work is to begin rectifying this deficiency. 
                                                
   14 This apparently was also true of the 19th century, as writes Hines in his Ph.D. dissertation. However, 
his study fails to explore the origins of this congruence, since his work, like the majority of others, focuses 
exclusively on the 19th century. Kerry Lee Hine, “Russian Military Thought: Its Evolution Through War 
and Revolution, 1860-1918” (Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, 1998), iii.
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Frustratingly, the quest for cotemporary scholarship on Russian Imperial military 
thought yields few results. Two comprehensive bibliographic collections were consulted 
for this work. The volume by Philip Clendenning and Roger Bartlett15 provided good 
suggestions for some preliminary primary research, but is in need of updating. Harry 
Nerhood’s book helped to look at Russia through the eyes of foreigners.16 Unfortunately,
neither of these works contain a single record, in any language, about Russian military 
thought of that time. As Peter Paret acutely noted, “Imperial Russian military history in 
general has received very little attention in modern Western scholarship and not a great 
deal more in the Soviet Union”17 (or in modern Russia).
Within the timeframe of ephemeral existence of the Romanov Empire, the 
eighteenth century had suffered the most neglect, military thought being one of its most 
overlooked victims. Among a miniscule collection of works dedicated to the study of the 
Russian Imperial Army, only three works are devoted to the examination of military 
thinking therein. One is Peter von Wahlde’s Ph.D. dissertation, Military Thought in 
Imperial Russia, a pioneering work whose publication has been too long over due. In his 
informative and thought provoking study, Wahlde mapped out the topology of the 
Russian military mind from the early Muscovite period until the fall of the Romanov 
dynasty. In his search for origins of Russian military thought, he linked them to the 
creation of the Military Academy in St. Petersburg in 1832. It was only then, he argues, 
that military studies reached the age of maturity in the Russian Empire.18 The corollary is 
                                                
    15 Philip Clendenning and Roger P. Bartlett. Eighteenth Century Russia: A Select Bibliography of Works 
Published Since 1955 (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1981).
    16 Harry Nerhood, To Russia and Return: An Annotated Bibliography of Travelers' English-Language
Accounts of Russia from the Ninth century to the Present (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1968).
    17 Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 899.
    18 Wahlde, viii-ix.
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that the work focuses on the nineteenth century, while the eighteenth century receives
only a brief glance and the efforts of eighteenth century Russian theorists are largely 
ignored. In addition to Wahlde’s dissertation, there have recently been two more major
studies done about Russian military thought by Carl van Dyke19 and Kerry Lee Hine. 
Their work thoroughly reflects the trends in Russian military thought in the nineteenth 
century, but the eighteenth century still remains uncovered. It appears that they too regard 
the 1830s as the founding period of Russian theoretical investigations into the nature of 
war and dismiss the texts from the eighteenth century as irrelevant. None of the above 
works give a serious analytical weight to the influences of the West on Russian military 
mind in the eighteenth century. The present thesis rectifies this deficiency and outlines
the importance of 18th century Russian military thought by highlighting the influence of 
Western military thought on Russian military theory.
In the study of Russian Imperial Army, 1914 has always been the traditional point 
of gravity, attracting to its orbit most of the research. Christopher Duffy still remains the 
only scholar who published a monograph about the Russian army of the eighteenth 
century in the English language. He offers a well researched survey of the Russian 
military establishment in the eighteenth century, but the scope reduces many significant 
events of the era to a summary. While his work provides new insights into the 
understanding of institutional reforms and evolution of the Russian armed forces
throughout the century, it is preoccupied with the analyses of battles and campaigns, 
while the development and advancement of military thought and theory remain 
unexplored. 
                                                
    19 Carl van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914. (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1998).
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The study of military thought in general has recently benefited from two recent 
works. Martin van Creveld‘s The Art of War: War and Military Thought20 covers ancient 
Chinese thought to the war in Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, but its broad scope makes it 
invariably deficient in substance. Finally, J. P. Storr’s unpublished dissertation has a 
promising title – The Nature of Military Thought – but its contents dwell on tactics and 
combat, and the analysis is centered on the British-American military doctrine.
Azar Gat’s brilliant The Origins of Military Thought has aided greatly in the 
formulation of this study. In it, Gat correctly argues that “the major currents of modern 
military thought emerged out of the cultural frameworks and the historical and 
philosophical outlooks of the Enlightenment” and the reaction of other schools of thought 
to this movement.21 The monograph covers thoroughly the eighteenth century, but not a 
single trace of Russian thought is found in the entire book. Military thinkers of the French 
enlightenment and the British and German theorists are discussed in great detail, while 
their Russian counterparts and their thoughts still await discovery. As Jeremy Black 
noted in his thought provoking book Rethinking Military History, Gat examined only the 
European thought “and the challenging question of thought elsewhere was not 
addressed.”22 Despite this geographical shortcoming, Gat’s work remains the only study 
that provides any interpretive synthesis of early modern European military thought. It is 
an authoritative volume in its own right and in many ways this project has been modeled,
in both style and approach, after Gat’s work.
                                                
    20 Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell, 2000).
    21 Azar Gat, The origins of military thought : from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), ix.
    22 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67.
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General, non-specific scholarship on topics of eighteenth century warfare is also
remarkably scattered. Jeremy Black has been one of the foremost contributors to the 
study of military art of that period, though in many of his books23 he is interested in the 
elusive military revolution at the expense of other theoretical developments. In other 
works24 he looks at the eighteenth century conflict from a global perspective and neither 
Russia nor military theory is central to his discussion. Christopher Duffy’s overview of 
the eighteenth century,25 and a recent monograph by Armstrong Starkey,26 have also 
helped to rescue the century’s wars and their participants from the dustbin of history and
to put their efforts back, to use Azar Gat’s phrase, on “the intellectual map of Europe.”27
Because none of the above mentioned studies have been able to adequately document and 
explain early Russian military thought, one must turn to the Russian works, in many 
cases in their original, eighteenth century form.
Surprisingly, both pre-revolutionary and Soviet scholarship has little to show 
when it comes to the study of its military imperial past. Books published before the 
Russian Revolution, even when they are accessible, are fragmented and incomplete. Their 
credibility is often questionable since it was a pre-revolutionary standard to overstate the 
successes of the imperial army. The problem is further complicated by the Soviet 
interlude when historical scholarship was biased for political and ideological reasons. The 
only significant and in-depth study of the Russian army is an excellent but rare four
volume work by A. A. Kersnovsky published in 1933. His treatment of the epoch of 
Catherine the Great is particularly illuminating. L. G. Beskrovnyi was another historian 
                                                
    23 Jeremy Black, European Warfare 1660-1815 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
    24 Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London: Cassell, 1999).
    25 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (New York: Atheneum, 1988).
    26 Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of the Enlightenment, 1700-1789 (Westport: Praeger, 2003).
    27 Gat, 3.
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of the Soviet era who substantially contributed to the research of the Imperial Army in 
the eighteenth century.28 Beskrovnyi’s overview of the dilemmas of Russian military 
history29 is also highly informative. His works on historiography30 and sources31 of the 
Russian Imperial army have yet to be surpassed. 
In post-Soviet Russia, publishers have a habit of reprinting earlier works, albeit 
with different covers. Indeed, very few new and original monographs about the Imperial 
army have come out since 1991. Instead, the bookshelves of Moscow are creaking under 
the weight of literature about Stalin, Hitler and the Second World War. If a book about 
the 18th century army emerges, it usually does so in the form of a biography32, injected 
with a generous dose of Russian nationalism. “Patriot” has become a fashionable name 
for a publishing house in Russia.33 Sometimes there is confusion in titles. A curious 
reader walking around a major Russian book store in Moscow or St. Petersburg might 
pick up one of the recently published, hefty titles such as History of the Russian Army34
only to discover that the volume actually covers only the nineteenth century.
The prospect of research would have been undoubtedly bleak, if not for the 
Russian custom to occasionally reprint collections of rare original documents. This study 
is based, as much as possible, on this primary material. A three-volume collection under 
                                                
    28 L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v vosemnadtsatom veke (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 
1958). 
    29 L. G. Beskrovnyi  and V. I. Shunkov, Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii (Moskva: Institut istorii, 
Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1969).
    30 L. G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki voennoi istoriografii Rossii (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 
1962).
    31 L. G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki po istochnikovedeniu voennoi istorii Rossii (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Akademii 
Nauk SSSR, 1957).
    32 A recent example of a highly positive and romanticism account of Potemkin can be found in N. Y. 
Bolotina, Knaz' Potemkin: geroi epohi Ekatirini Velikoi (Moscow: Vechi, 2006).
    33 A.V. Buganov and V. I. Buganov, Polkovodzi XVIII veka (Moscow: Patriot, 1992).
    34 N. Volkonskii, Istoriia Russkoi Armii (Moskva: AST, 2004).
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the editorship of Fortunatov35 and a colossal four volume-anthology put together by 
Mesheryakov, 36 both published by the Ministry of Defence of the USSR shortly after 
World War II, constitute the cornerstone of this work. Combined, they yield over two 
thousand letters, articles of correspondence, military orders, and raw statistical data. 
Recent archival publications that provide commentary on military works of the Russian 
enlightenment or publish them in their entirety have also been consulted. Goncharov’s 
volume proved indispensable for this work.37 The wide availability and relative ease of 
access to this amorphous body of literature makes the current state of research into the 
Russian eighteenth century military experience all the more perplexing and 
unexplainable. In the words of William Odom, “this is a case where the dialogue between 
the past and the present cries out from neglect.”38
Methodology
The period between 1757 and 1800 signifies Russian involvement in the Seven Years’ 
War against the Prussia of Frederick the Great and the Russian withdrawal from the War 
of the Second Coalition during the French Revolutionary Wars. In this relatively short
period of time, the foundations for Russian military thought were laid down and 
solidified. This period was chosen because it presents an especially fertile soil to examine 
the transfer of Western ideas and practices to the east. Additionally, in Russia, the 
absence of significant political and military consequences from the French Revolution 
and the turmoil in Europe allows for an almost unbroken historical narrative. 
                                                
    35 P. K. Fortunatov, ed., P. A. Rumyantsev, 3 vols. (Moskva: Voennoye Ministerstvo SSSR, 1953).
    36 G. P. Mesheryakov, ed., A. V. Suvorov, 4 vols. (Moskva: Voennoye Ministerstvo SSSR, 1949-53).
    37 V. Goncharov, Russkaya voennaya mysl’: VIII vek (St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 2003).
    38 William E. Odom, “Russian Military History and the Present,” in Bruce Menning and David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, eds. Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia 
from Peter the Great to the Revolution (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 337.
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As far as methodology is concerned, it is important to discern what this study is 
and is not. This study is a history of ideas and thoughts which, in the words of Arthur 
Lovejoy, is “something at once more specific and less restricted than the history of 
philosophy.”39 Those seeking a deep knowledge of eighteenth century military texture of 
the battlefield or Russian tactics will be disappointed. “A history which aspires to 
traverse long periods of time, or to be universal…,” adds Hegel, “…must foreshorten its 
pictures by abstractions; and this includes not merely the omission of events and deeds, 
but whatever is involved in the fact that Thought [sic] is, after all, the most trenchant 
epitomist.” From this follows that “a battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains 
its original proportions, but is put off with a bare mention.”40 Accordingly, in this study,
great military engagements will be treated only as a subordinate subject to the theory 
behind them to illustrate how ideas were manifested in reality. Nor is this a work of 
philosophy.41 The analytical scope of the essay stops short of the philosophical 
discussions and prefers to engage the material in a more concrete manner. As such, it 
follows in the footsteps of von Wahlde and Gat.
The present work will be based on close textual analysis of 18th century 
documents. The study approaches the subject of its inquiry through personalities in an 
attempt to gain a better understanding of the web of abstract thoughts and nebulous 
notions penned by their promulgators. The discussion below concentrates on two 
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individuals who have contributed the most to the formulation of theoretical edifice upon 
which successful understanding of war could be built, and who in turn established a 
framework for subsequent development of Russian military theory. As such, the author 
hopes, as much as possible and despite focusing on two men, to avoid the traditional 
philosophical frameworks that surround the analysis of military history (namely the Whig 
Interpretation of History, the Great Man approach, and Technological Determinism 
theories).42
To establish fertile grounds for further analysis and to situate Russian military 
thought in the eighteenth century, one must look briefly at the trends in military theory in 
the rest of Europe. This is done in the first chapter, which serves three purposes. First, it 
surveys the military thought in the climate of the enlightenment, and samples the works 
of French, Prussian and English theorists, especially in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The chapter then turns to the practice of war during the age of reason, and
concludes with a sketch of the Russian Army in the eighteenth century. The second 
chapter shifts to Russia and to the works of Count Peter Rumyantsev, the father of 
military thought in the Russian Empire. Next, the discussion turns to the monumental 
efforts of Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov, who contributed the most to early Russian 
tactical theory and troop management. The epilogue of this work sheds some light on the 
general trends of early Russian military thought, assesses its Westernization, and 
examines its relevance to the present.
The principal omissions of this work are German, French, Italian and Turkish 
materials, which have been consulted only by proxy due to their relative scarcity and 
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language barriers. The dates have been converted to Western European New Style
(Georgian), which was eleven days ahead of the Old Russian (Julian) calendar (today the 
difference is thirteen days due to the accumulation of extra leap years). The Library of 
Congress translation system will be used to render Russian words into English. Where 
Russian words are used in plural, a “y” instead of an “s” will be added (e.g. soldaty in 
place of soldats). All translations from Russian and all diagrams are the author’s, unless 
specified otherwise. Old Russian orthography in this essay has been given a more modern
rendition, but the stylistic peculiarities and contemporary idioms of the Russian text have 
been, as much as possible, preserved to add authenticity and style to the text.  
17
I
S I N S  O F E N L I G H T E N M E N T:  T H O U G H T,  WA R  
A N D  A R M I E S
“I therefore shut the door and read it through,
Intent to gain by heart, with instant labour
The Art, my friends, the art –
to kill my neighbour.”
Voltaire, La Tactique (1774)
This chapter surveys the military thought of Western thinkers of eighteenth century, 
briefly discusses the character of war in the age of reason, and concludes with a sketch of 
the Russian military. To appreciate the work of Russian military intellect in the second 
half of eighteenth century it is necessary to place the efforts of its theorists in the complex
matrix of synergy of western thought and general trends in warfare. This creates a basis 
for contrast and comparison that facilitates a retrospective view of the developments in 
Russia. A practical rendition of warfare in the eighteenth century is necessary to place 
these developments in broader context. Finally, it is essential to take into account the 
material and social qualities of the Russian Imperial Army to gauge the condition in 
which Rumyantsev’s and Suvorov’s ideas found their application.
From Folard to von Bülow: Theorists of Western Europe
The greatest sin of the rational mind, carefully cultivated by the scientific, progressive 
and secular spirit of the Enlightenment, was the new intellectual vigour that it gave to the 
study of war. France was the cultural and intellectual center for much of the eighteenth
century and it was here that theorists penned some of the most interesting and articulate 
ideas about war, its conduct, and its theory. The intellectual journey of eighteenth century 
18
military thought in France began with Jean-Charles de Folard (1669-1752). As a young 
man he joined Charles XII on his campaigns of the Great Northern War against Russia. 
By observing the conduct of the Swedish king’s forces, Folard became a great advocate 
of shock tactics which, he believed, could “overcome the apparent stalemate produced by 
the linear fire tactics of that time.”43 He was sceptical of firepower, and believed that 
firearms reduced the offensive capacity of French armies. His ideas became important in 
the Russian context, especially with the rise of Alexander Suvorov. As the chapter will 
show, the foremost military thinkers in Europe rejected Folard’s devotion to the bayonet, 
while in Russia it found a dedicated following.44 Folard’s lengthy study of Polybius,
which he published between 1727 and 1730 (Histoire de Polybe), convinced him that 
ancient armies gained victory through hand-to-hand combat rather than relying on 
archery or catapults to decide the outcome of the battle. This led him to propose the use 
of phalanx, or columns, which he argued were more agile and flexible than lines. In his 
works he outlined in great depth the tactical transformation of battalions into files. 
Bordering on mathematical precision, Folard guaranteed that “the Column is to be 
formed in forty Seconds of a Minute by this Tactic.”45 In 1724, three years after the 
conclusion of the Great Northern War, Folard published his major treatise Nouvelles 
découvertres sur la guerre, which is still hard to come by in the English language. 
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His work was one of the main precursors to what Armstrong Starkey calls 
‘enlightened military thought’. The intellectual model of this early French writer 
possessed the three pillars that reflected the spirit of the time. First, Folard’s thought 
reflected a keen fascination with classical Rome and Greece. It was believed that the
military systems of the ancients could serve as an ideal for the present. Second, Folard 
attempted to examine war from a scientific perspective to discover universal principles 
guarding its conduct. Finally, and most vitally, by examining the role of close combat in 
achieving victory, he addressed the psychological dimensions of war, something 
examined even deeper by his followers.46 Folard’s thoughts influenced the next 
generation of military theorists, among which were such celebrated figures as Maurice de 
Saxe, Frederick the Great and even Napoleon.
The life and career of Herman Maurice, Comte de Saxe (1696-1750), was typical 
of a member of eighteenth century metropolitan elite. A bastard son of the Polish king, he 
served against the French at the age of twelve, joined Eugene of Savoy on his campaigns 
against the Turks, and could have even shared the throne with the Russian Empress Anne, 
if not for an untimely intrigue with one of the ladies of the court at St. Petersburg.47
Banned by Catherine the Great, he went to France in search of fortune. His brilliant 
victory at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 against the British, Dutch and Hanoverian 
armies earned him the Marshal’s baton and instant fame throughout Europe. 
Besides being one of the most capable commanders of Louis XV, de Saxe also 
left a literary legacy. Written in 1732 and published in 1757, his famous My Reveries 
Upon the Art of War (Mes reveries sur l'art de la guerre) became one of the most 
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influential military essays of the century. Conceived in thirteen nights of fever (and some 
say under the influence of opium), Mes Rêveries did not offer a new system of war, like 
the writings of Folard.48 Instead, de Saxe was one of the first writers to view the study of 
war within the emerging competition of artistic and scientific interpretations.  The 
opening pages of his work attest to his philosophical deliberation. “War is a science 
covered with shadows in whose obscurity one cannon move with assured step,” he wrote. 
“Routine and prejudice, the natural result of ignorance, are its foundations and support,” 
began the Rêveries.49 His verdict mimicked Folard’s – “War is a trade for the ignorant 
and a science of the expert.”50 He approved of Folard’s attempts to establish universal 
customs and principles and “pass the bounds of prejudices,” but Folard went too far for 
de Saxe. For the victor of Fontenoy there was no universal theory of war, since the 
outcome of a military conflict “depends upon an infinite number of circumstances”51 for 
which no system can fully account.
Thus there emerged early but clear voices in the debate surrounding the 
foundations of the military craft which were absent from the Russian military discourse.
This debate became especially heated in Europe in the 19th century and continued to 
dominate the minds of foremost military writers ever since. The positivism of the 
scientific age and the reliance on methodology to produce general rules defining the 
conduct of war clashed with Clausewitzian pre-cursors who leaned towards the irrational 
nature of human behaviour, which irrevocably defined the nature of armed struggle. To 
understand the nature of war, de Saxe argued a hundred years before von Clausewitz, one 
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must study the nature of the human heart. “Without a knowledge of the human heart, one 
is dependent upon the favour of fortune, which sometimes is very inconsistent.” Avoiding 
scientific rhetoric, de Saxe relied on the elements of human character: courage, 
intelligence and health were the three qualities of a successful general.52 In other words, 
he proposed a serious inquiry into the psychological dimension of warfare, independent 
of schematic systems, rules, principles and models that dominated so many contemporary 
titles. De Saxe wanted to go beyond the traditional subjects of tactics, weapons and 
logistics and look at factors that influenced the morale and motivation of his troops, as 
well as what kind of people should be recruited to serve in the armed forces.53 Consistent 
with his time, de Saxe looked to the ancients for inspiration, but here too he disagreed 
with his contemporaries. Unlike his mentor Folard, who saw the phalanx as the epitome 
of military organization, de Saxe favoured the Roman legion.54 Moreover, he envisioned
this unit to be self contained; to consist of cavalry, infantry and artillery; to be mobile; 
and to be able to operate independently of the main army while still remaining an integral 
part of the national military force. What de Saxe envisaged was the structural unit known 
today as a division. By dwelling deeper into the human element of combat and by looking
beyond the regimental organization of the army, Maurice de Saxe made a giant leap over 
contemporary French thought, and his words captivated European military intellectuals 
for the next century.
French military enlightenment thought found its most powerful evocation in the 
writings of Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743-1790), who brought 
principles and ideas of his predecessors to their logical, theoretical outcome. In 1772, 
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when Guibert was only twenty-nine, he published his two volume Essai général de 
Tactique and became a salon celebrity. Voltaire’s poem La Tactique was written in praise 
of Guibert’s work, and several French Revolutionary ordnances were based on ideas 
developed in his essay.55
Guibert looked at war as a science and, reminiscent of de Saxe, wrote in his usual 
prolix style:
Almost all sciences have certain or fixed elements, which succeeding 
ages have only extended and developed, but the tactics, till now 
wavering and uncertain, confined to time, arms, customs, all the 
physical and moral qualities of a people have of course been obliged 
to vary without end….56
Hastily dismissing all the previous attempts as insufficient, Guibert sought to construct 
general and universal principles for military tactics that would account for the endless 
variations in military theory. 
His work is detailed, technical, and innovative. He was the first of the eighteenth 
century theorists to think about grand tactics.57 His book was among the first attempts to 
differentiate between tactics and strategy.58 He sought to apply mathematical analysis to 
the study of war and continued to advocate the use of columns. What endeared his work 
to the salons of Paris and subsequently to the French army, however, was his ability to 
make purely military subjects concomitant with political discourse. Through his analysis 
of the dismal French performance during the Seven Years’ War, Guibert insisted that the 
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military power of a state should be based upon the resources drawn from the entire nation
and not just a standing army. National participation would be achieved through general 
conscription. The question was how to resolve the apparent dilemma of sustainability. 
The Leviathan that Guibert was proposing to create would feed off the enemy land during 
wartime and thus make war pay for itself. This method, he argued, would save the 
national treasury from certain bankruptcy. Finally, the new force required a new 
organizational palette for its control and movement. Picking up where de Saxe had left 
off, Guibert thought it sensible that the colossal national armies be atomized into 
numerous, smaller independent formations that would come together at the moment of 
battle.59
The manner of Guibert’s thought and the model that he developed in the 1770s is 
of special interest to this study because General Alexander Suvorov was simultaneously 
devising a similar model in Russia. As this thesis demonstrates, Russian thought 
stumbled upon similar conclusions as the theoreticians in the West.  In the process, 
however, it avoided the politically explosive ideas of the Enlightenment inherent in the 
thought of the French military theorists. 
As Azar Gat rightly points out, Britain could boast only one military thinker who 
substantially contributed to the Enlightenment discourse about war in the eighteenth 
century, the rest of them having been silenced by the dominant tactical ideas of the Duke 
of Marlborough.60 This solitary exception was Henry Lloyd (1720-1783), who served in 
numerous armies and had a prosperous career in espionage. In the 1740s, he spied for 
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Marshal de Saxe and drew up plans for the French invasion of Britain.61 In 1773 he 
joined the Russian forces as divisional commander against the Turks. His major works, 
now diligently collected by Patrick J. Speelman in a single volume, reflect an 
intermingling of both French and Prussian lines of thought. Lloyd was the earliest of the 
proponents of the scientific approach to the study of war. He compared the army to a 
mechanical device which, “like all other machines …is composed of various parts, and its 
perfection will depend, first on that of its several parts; and second, on the manner in 
which they are arranged….”62 Through his histories of the Seven Years’ War and by 
applying “mechanistic-materialistic interpretation of the world” to the study of war, he 
began to change the focal point of European military thought from the “organization of 
armies to the conduct of operation.”63 At the same time, he borrowed de Saxe’s 
terminology and his concerns about the ‘human heart.’ Lloyd gave much attention to the 
factors behind the motivation of the troops and to moral forces present in the conduct of 
war. Furthermore, by looking at liberties and passions that motivated the troops in the 
ranks he put a human face on a common soldier and established that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between soldiers and their commanders.64 By comparison, no Russian 
thinker achieved a comparable scientific and moralistic synthesis of warfare. Neither did 
it exist in the Prussia of Frederick the Great, where the lot of the common soldier –
simple cannon fodder – was considered inconsequential in the grand scheme of war.
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Frederick II (1712 –1786) occupies a special place in the study of military thought 
in the eighteenth century, if only because of his political position. While the theoreticians 
and generals were scribbling away their voluminous treatises, Frederick had an 
opportunity to test the validity of their ideas in practice. He could not be considered a 
founder of a new system, like Folard or Guibert, but his oblique order, which he no doubt 
borrowed from the writings of Vegetius,65 made a great impression on his 
contemporaries. One observer writes:
The favourite manoeuvres of the King of Prussia, are the change of 
front, (of which the oblique order is always the basis) and the 
forming it into columns on the right and left, by means of which he 
directs his greatest strength to the particular point he has in view, and 
at the same time secures the weaker part of his army from the enemy 
attack.66
Frederick was also one of the few military men who began to consider strategy67
in war within the political environment. “Strategy is based on the forces you have, on the 
strength of the enemy, on the situation of the country where you want to carry the war, 
and on the actual political condition of Europe,” he observed.68 Despite many of such 
sagacious statements, Frederick never significantly departed from the styles of eighteenth 
century warfare, nor from their tactics or battle formations. On the purely tactical level, 
however, he showed Europe the limits of what could be achieved by methods and 
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standards of the time. Paradoxically he could not overstep the boundaries that he himself 
so clearly identified. To do that, Frederick would have had to change the socio-economic 
relationship within the army and base it on the national system of Guibert. It would have 
revolutionized his kingdom in the same way levée en masse revolutionized France, and 
his Prussian mind was not prepared for such innovation.69
Frederick’s military thought went through a two-phased evolution. In his famed 
1747 Instructions to the Generals, the young soldier-king wrote that “war is decided only 
by battles, and it is not finished except by them.”70 He regarded war as an art, 
commenting that “there is no finer and more useful art than the art of war….”71 After 
participating in some of the bloodiest battles of the century, however, he began to re-
examine his previous attitudes toward the conduct of war and his mind began to recoil at 
the idea of pitched engagements. In later stages of his life, as many historians have 
observed, Frederick resorted to the strategy of attrition, especially during the Seven 
Years’ War.72 After 1763, he advocated caution and manoeuvre and the search for a 
decisive battle was to be avoided. By the end of his life, the military thought of Frederick 
the Great became reactionary. 
The degree in humanitarianism in Prussian thought is important to juxtapose with 
the humanistic tendencies of the Russian military later on. Beneath the tacit wit of 
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Frederick’s pen often lurked a mind of a cold blooded soldier that surfaced in his military 
writings. His army was known for its martinet character, and the philosopher-king 
maintained that the soldiers should fear their officers more than the enemy. Advising his 
generals on the manners of espionage, Frederick wrote:
If greed for silver does not work, it is necessary to employ fear. Seize 
some burgomaster of a city where you have a garrison, or some 
mayor of a village where you camp, and force him to take a 
disguised man, who speaks the language of the country, and under 
some pretext to conduct him as his servant in the enemy army. 
Threaten him that if he does not bring your man back, you will cut 
the throat of his wife and children whom you hold under guard….73
Voltaire had a good reason to abhor the militarism of his friend, and it soon became clear 
that Frederick the Great was a humanist, not a humanitarian. Such constructive outbursts 
of predetermined cruelty, especially against civilians, could not be located in the official 
Russian texts that guided the development of Russian military theory.
Dietrich Heinrich Freiherr von Bülow (1757-1807), whose Geist des neuern 
Kriegssystems was published in 1799 and translated into English in 1806 as The Spirit of 
the Modern System of War, furthered the scientific approach established by Henry Lloyd. 
As such, Von Bülow’s thought also serves as a point of contrast to the Russian thought of 
the same period. Von Bülow’s ideas present an intellectual extreme of the enlightenment 
thought, and his writings denote what Azar Gat calls “a geometric science of strategy.” 
Indeed, in the twentieth century von Bülow would be regarded as one of the founding 
fathers and advocates of geopolitical science. 74 He was a critic of the Frederickian 
system and the Prussian model and a supporter of the revolutionary warfare practiced by 
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Republican France. For his unorthodox military views and his criticism of the Prussian 
army, von Bülow was sentenced to prison where he subsequently died. 
By subordinating war to the empirical analysis of mathematics, von Bülow sought 
to mould it from art into science. At the end of his book he exclaimed: “War will no 
longer be called an art, but a science; for art is the application of science. Science is in the 
mind only; art descends from the mind into the sphere of activity.”75 His attempt at severe 
conceptualization of military theory left von Bülow with abstractions far removed and 
isolated from the confusion of combat and unpredictability of battle, as the following 
example suggests:
The army E, (fig 11.) acting from the base A D B of the right-angled 
triangle A C B, towards the object C, has no occasion to fear being 
cut off, or that its convoys will be intercepted; for, though the enemy 
may, indeed, cut off the lines of operation B C, or A C, according to 
the side from which he comes, he cannot possibly cut off the line C 
D, or any other, either between B and D, or A and D.76 (Figure 2)
Some fifty-nine illustrations, resembling 
carefully drawn mathematical shapes,
are appended at the end of his book. The 
human face of an individual soldier 
remains absent in his thought. Even 
though von Bülow’s ideas aroused the 
curiosity of late eighteenth century minds and agitated the thinkers of the later years, 
many of his pronouncements were deemed impractical and many of his conclusions 
erroneous. For example, the insistence “that the number, and not the excellence of troops 
                                                
    75 Dietrich Heinrich Freiherr von Bülow, The Spirit of the Modern System of War (London: Sold by T. 
Egerton, 1806), 228.
    76 Ibid,. 59.
Figure 2: Geometric Science of Strategy of von 
Bülow, The Spirit of the Modern System of 
War, Pl. 2 .
29
gives success in modern system of war,”77 was challenged systematically even during his 
lifetime.  Thus there emerge three threads in the military thought of the European 
Enlightenment: tacit appreciation of the political side of war, especially in Prussia; 
development of psychological factors in combat; and finally the unprecedented 
application of pseudo-scientific principles to the study of warfare.
“The Sport of Kings”: Some Remarks on 18th Century Warfare
It is important to appreciate the scope of armed conflict of Europe during the height of 
the ancien régime because it represented one of the major modes of human experience 
during the eighteenth century. Almost two-thirds of the years between 1700 and 1800 
were consumed by the ravages and fires of war which, as the years progressed, became 
more bloody and global in scope. The casualties grew in consecutive progression during 
the period: 64,000 in the Great Northern War, which began in 1700 and lasted for twenty-
one years; the War of Austrian Succession produced 359,000 casualties in eight years;
and during the Seven Years’ War the total bill for the dead and wounded reached 
992,000. The climax was reached during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars,
which resulted in a total loss of 2.5 million lives by 1815.78 It is not surprising that,
according to some historians, the Age of Enlightenment “began with Marlborough and 
Eugene and ended with Suvorov and Bonaparte.”79
To understand the outlines of broad trends and evolutions in the practice of 
European warfare, a brief and general sketch of eighteenth century battlefields is 
necessary. After all, the battlefield was the inescapable product of intellectual constructs
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– the arena where armies of Europe manifested their ideas in practice and exhibited their 
understanding of theories of war. Did the theoretical ponderings of military writers find 
their way to the battlefield and, if so, how were their ideas applied in war? First, in the 
age of Enlightenment, diplomacy was often subordinated to the act of war, and not vice 
versa. Little credence was given to political discourse. For instance, to Denis Diderot, the 
father of Encyclopédie, diplomacy was an “obscene art that hides itself in the folds of 
deceit.”80 Second, there was a salient distinction between wars of annihilation and wars 
of attrition. Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century military philosopher, first examined this 
after the French Revolutionary Wars. According to him, eighteenth century strategy 
focused on attrition rather than annihilation of the enemy. The latter plays an increasingly 
omnipresent role in struggles that are fuelled by ideological and religious reasons. Since 
war in the eighteenth century was primarily driven by reasons of state and took the form 
of large and often shifting coalitions, annihilation was a “hopeless venture.”81 The 
exception to this rule was the wars fought against the Turks in the east, where the Russian 
and Ottoman armies (under the religious banners of their respective empires) adopted 
doctrines that went beyond the framework of limited war carefully observed in Western 
Europe. The development of the tactical and strategic principles of annihilation are 
discerned in the thought of Russian Field Marshals Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander 
Suvorov in subsequent chapters. 
As far as forces were concerned, several tendencies are apparent, many of which 
continued from the previous century. As M. S. Anderson correctly observed, “the 
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eighteenth century was not an age of rapid development of military techniques,”82 in 
contrast to the preceding two centuries. Rather it was a century of a slow but powerful 
process, a menacing dreadnought that accumulated inertia with each passing year and 
reached its crescendo in Napoleonic Era. The armies did not see a substantial increase 
since the time of Marlborough and Eugene, and, as Duffy writes, “sixty thousand troops 
were about the maximum that could be managed by the command and control machinery 
of the time.”83 As the century dragged on, pikemen from the era of Louis XIV were 
phased out, as were the “heavy and often unreliable matchlock guns.” In their place were 
introduced lighter and more rapid-firing flintlock muskets, armed with bayonets.84 New 
forces also made their debut on European battlefields. Light infantry in Europe was first 
used by the Russians in the Seven Years’ War85 and significant improvements were made 
in mobile artillery by the French. Throughout the eighteenth century, mercenaries gave 
way to standardized uniform, drill, and equipment. That is not to say that the soldiers of 
fortune faced chronic unemployment. On the eve of the revolution, France still had 
40,000 mercenaries serving under its colors.86
Socio-cultural character, administration and punishments for crimes and 
insubordination varied greatly in European armies. They went from flogging and cutting 
noses for desertion to gory whippings for theft. When James Boswell, an English 
nobleman, observed a regimental exercise on his grand tour to Prussia in 1764, he wrote 
that “the soldiers seemed in terror. For the least fault they were beaten like dogs….I also 
saw a deserter pass the baguette [flogged] twelve times. He was much cut. It made me 
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sick to see it.”87 Officers, on the other hand, could not have been dealt with in the similar 
manner by their superiors. Christopher Duffy explains that:
Major infractions of duty or subordination were properly the affairs 
of the court martial, but Frederick and the Russian field-marshal 
Suvorov were both aware that it would have been subversive of 
discipline to drag a senior officer before such a tribunal….They 
preferred to wait until the wretched man had committed some minor 
mistake on the parade or on manoeuvres, and then break him on the 
spot. They thereby avoided a public scandal, while astonishing the 
army by a spectacular display of tyrannical power.88
Most of the time abuses by senior military administrators were so numerous and 
widespread that most officers went unpunished, and in many cases their abuses were 
never discovered.
The conduct of war was governed by laws and formalities that were duly observed 
by all armies of Europe. Alexander Suvorov supplies the most illustrative example. In 
early December 1790, he was put in charge of the siege of Ismail fortress on the river 
Danube, in modern day Ukraine. On December 18th, Suvorov sent a short note to 
Mehmet Pasha, the commander of the Ismail garrison: “I have arrived here with the army. 
24 hours for deliberation – your will; my first shot – no will; storm – death. This I leave 
at your consideration.”89 What Suvorov meant here is that within 24 hours the Turks 
could surrender on their own terms. That privilege would be forfeited after a day, when 
Russian cannons would open fire. If the enemy would surrender at that time, the Russians 
would set the terms. If the Turks still would not surrender and waited for the Russians to 
storm the fortress, they could expect the most savage fighting. In the case of Ismail, the 
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Turks, confident of their unapproachable and impregnable position, chose to try to 
withstand the Russian assault. As a result, by the end of the day there were just 9,000 
people left in Ismail out of a population of 35,000.90 Suvorov had 30,000 troops and at 
least a third had perished trying to take the citadel.91 “It is no exaggeration when I say 
that the gutters of the town were dyed with blood,” 92 recalled the Comte de Damas in his 
memoirs. 
Even though the case of Ismail was extreme even by the standards of the day, it 
accorded with the military custom of eighteenth century warfare. As Martin Van Creveld 
summarizes, it was “a regular procedure developed for surrendering fortresses with 
honour by means of the so called belle capitulations.”93 If a fortress surrendered the day 
agreed on by both parties, the defenders would be spared. If, however, they decided to 
stubbornly hold out, rape and total pillage was a matter of course to compensate the 
soldiers for their losses and frustrations. 
The same fundamental architecture of laws and reciprocal behaviour that was 
exhibited in siege warfare was also seen in regular battles. Bruce Menning eloquently 
wrote that, in the eighteenth century, “operations and tactics resembled a well-
choreographed minuet in which lines of forces, movement, and mass all corresponded 
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with prevailing conceptions of order, clarity, and logic.”94 This was vividly manifested in 
the so-called cordon system that characterized European warfare from the 1680s to about
the 1820s and was enthusiastically and universally applied by all armies of Europe 
(Figure 3).
Frederick II was one of the greatest practitioners of the cordon system, and wrote in 
his Instructions that what is most advantageous is “to occupy such positions yourself as 
enable you to cover a great deal of the country by small movements and so located that 
you will never be cut off from your own supplies nor from places which you should 
protect.”95 Carl von Clausewitz supplied one of the best critical explanations of this 
disposition. “By a cordon we mean any system of defence in which a series of inter-
connected posts is intended to give direct protection to an area,” he wrote in Vom Krieg. 
At its heart, the cordon involved the even spreading of one’s armed elements across the 
battlefields and theaters of war. The goal of such disposition was to cover lines of 
communications and be everywhere at the same time. According to von Clausewitz, the 
function of the cordon was to withstand a “slight attack” and not “the main force of the 
enemy.” The philosophy of the cordon system was defensive and this was the nature “of 
all the lines and frontier defences of the European states bordering on Asia and 
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Figure 3. A tactical cordon
- a cavalry regiment - an infantry regiment - an artillery battery
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Turkey.”96 It did not intend to destroy the enemy on the field of battle, and the application 
of this system to the military topography of combat meant that engagements were 
indecisive and a crushing victory less feasible. Indeed, sieges and the defence of strategic 
fortifications “was a much more common military experience than battle” 97 in the 
eighteenth century.
The cordon system manifested itself two ways. First, it could be seen at the 
strategic level in the construction of fortresses and citadels across the borders of former 
European empires (especially France) fearful of invasions by the Hapsburgs and Russia. 
Its application could also be observed at the tactical level. When opposing armies met in 
combat, the three fighting elements (humans, horses, and guns) were arranged in a 
recognizable linear fashion across the battlefield. This milieu of flesh and metal was 
usually distributed in two lines stretching for up to seven kilometres, comprising three 
rows each. The infantry was located in the middle, the cavalry was on the flanks to ensure 
its freedom of movement, and the artillery was placed in the intervals among the infantry 
battalions.98 From a bird’s eye, this setup resembled a game of chess with each regiment 
corresponding to a piece on the chessboard.
Naturally, the cordon put a heavy emphasis on drill and discipline of the soldiers. 
Eighteenth century armies were composed of highly trained professionals, who when 
killed, could not be easily replaced, since a lot of time and effort went into training, 
feeding and clothing the recruits. Cannons were expensive, and cavalry needed constant 
upkeep. Indeed, “the eighteenth century army was an expensive tool.” Understandably, 
sovereigns were hesitant to risk pitched battles and generals “had little to gain, and much 
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to lose, from serious fighting.” 99 This meant that, at least in Western Europe, “strategy 
and military thinking generally were still based mainly on ideas of limited war, of caution 
and avoidance of the uncertainties of great pitched battles.”100 The corollary to this 
thinking was that, by the mid 1700s, manoeuvre had acquired a new purpose. Since the 
mentality of a general officer dictated him that “it is better to preserve your own troops 
than to destroy the troops of the enemy,” armies often embarked on elaborate manoeuvres 
to deliberately avoid the enemy and to achieve a strategic victory by cutting his lines of 
communications and compelling the foe to retreat.101 When approached from this 
perspective, defensive disposition and strategy seemed more productive than aggressive 
offensive.
The disadvantages of the cordon system are immediately apparent to a modern 
reader but they were not so to its practitioners. The linear disposition of forces 
constrained operational maneuverability of the army or any one of its elements. In 
addition, the flanks and especially the rear were always vulnerable because they were 
inherently exposed. Furthermore, movement was restricted.  When an advance was made, 
it had to be done slowly to retain the proper step and formations. The main deficiency of 
the cordon battlefield system, however, was the dispersion of striking power. The 
concentration of forces in one particular spot on the battlefield under the cordon system 
was almost unattainable.
In retrospect, the cordon system reveals a crisis of military thought. There was a 
need for development of new strategies and tactics which would be able to overthrow the 
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existing method of conducting warfare and break the chains restraining soldiers, officers 
and armies.102 One of the first armies that recognized this crisis, and offered a practical 
substitute that would prove to be very successful against the established norms, was the 
army of the Romanovs.
An Army of Best and Worst Qualities: the Russian Army in the 18th Century
At this point it is important to shift the attention of the narrative from intellectual and 
practical topologies of the Western warfare to looking due East to briefly survey the army 
of Imperial Russia. In the eighteenth century, Russia faced almost an uninterrupted 
continuum of warfare that stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. The 
century began with a Great Northern War that persisted for over twenty years (1700-21), 
when Russia challenged the hegemony of Sweden in the Baltic. A year later, Russia 
launched military offensives against Persia (1722-32) that lasted for a decade. After that 
came the War of Polish Succession (1733-35), the war with the Turks (1736-39) and four 
campaigns against the Crimean Tatars (1735-38). This was followed by a Swedish War 
of 1741-43 and the devastating Seven Years’ War (1757-62) where Russia shed much 
blood and money for meagre gains. The reign of Catherine the Great brought with it 
another four major wars: the First Polish War (1768-72), the First Russo-Turkish War 
(1768-74), the Second Turkish War (1787-91), another war with Sweden (1788-90), and 
a Polish Civil War (1794-95). In 1799-1800 the Russians found themselves on the 
offensive against the French in Holland, Italy and Switzerland.103 With the unprecedented 
expansion and militarism of the Russian state after 1721 “the military center of gravity of 
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the continent had…moved markedly to the east.” 104 No longer could France, England or 
Prussia ignore ‘Europe east of the Elbe’ when settling their military or diplomatic 
quarrels. If in 1731 the approximate strength of the Russian army was 132,000, by the 
end of the century it soared to 458,000.105 It was owing to the ruthless and calculated 
determination of the Russian sovereigns, especially of Catherine II, “that Russia was 
finally accepted as a European Power of vital importance.”106 By the mid-eighteenth
century, the timid child of Petrine westernization had evolved into an impressive enforcer 
of the imperial authority in much of eastern and northern Europe.  
This power was projected, above all, by the Imperial Army. Efforts to 
Europeanize Russian military thought began early on.107 The Westernization of Russian 
began in earnest at the twilight of the seventeenth century, when the Peter I’s hurricane 
of energy descended upon Russia. In 1694, Peter the Great, the first Russian emperor, 
enacted a decree that drafted all of the nobility into the service of the state, for life. Two-
thirds were designated for the army and the navy, and the remaining one third was 
destined for the civil service. The ‘noble draft’ produced a strange mix of old and new 
nobility for the embryonic officer corps. The gradual Europeanization of the Russian elite 
that began in the mid-17th century, and encouraged by Peter at the beginning of the 18th,
meant that by the 1720s “Russian officers universally discussed military science using 
European (usually German) terms.” The manners and conduct of Russian officers also 
“took on the shape of [European] professionalism.”108
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Peter III, the grandson of Peter the Great, revoked the much hated edict that 
required nobles to serve in the armed forces and in civil service. The first point of Peter 
III’s 1762 Manifesto Emancipating the Russian Nobility read: “All nobles currently in 
Our [sic] various services may continue therein as long as they wish and their condition 
permits them….”109 In effect, this manifesto terminated the delicate link, so carefully 
nurtured by Peter the Great, between the powerful Russian nobility and their active, as 
well as intellectual, contribution to the security of the imperial state. When Catherine the 
Great came to the throne in July 1762, more concessions came to the nobles and the 
martial vigour of the 1720s was lost forever. 
The lack of expertise and interest of Russian nobility in martial matters meant 
that, after Peter the Great’s death, military knowledge had to be harnessed increasingly 
from the West. A large number of foreign experts and commanders, especially of German 
and later French extraction, flocked to Russia, lured by promises of money, adventure, 
and fame.110 Even though Russian aristocrats formed the bulk of the officer corps, 
Lindsey Hughes observed that “foreigners predominated at the very top ranks until quite 
late” 111 in the century. While the French and German languages were second nature to 
the Russian nobles, western officers possessed little understanding of the native tongues.  
Accordingly, how they managed to communicate with their Russian illiterate troops is a 
curious mystery. As the Russian empire drifted into the nineteenth century, the western 
minds left a considerable imprint on the Russian military machine. Austrian, German, 
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English, French, and even Swedish officers helped to import new ideas and practices into 
the Russian army.  It benefited from this knowledge, especially in the technical realms. 
Even though the Russian army of the eighteenth century was outwardly almost 
indistinguishable from the armies of the West, it was nevertheless a different military 
animal. The backbone of the Russian military behemoth was the serf.112 Illiterate, 
religious and with strong ties to the land, he was the perfect subject for the Russian army. 
The length of service during the first half of the century was for life; in the second half it 
was reduced to twenty-five years, which changed little for most of the conscripts. During 
the long and often unbroken service to the empire, the recruits were subjected to a healthy 
dose of discipline, religious patriotism and “militaristic manliness.” The sum product of 
this process was a “wholly militarized creature” 113 ready to shoulder the burden of long 
marches and hardships of camp life in the name of Orthodox religion and the Tsar 
batyushka (“little-father”). In addition to the serf, another peculiarity that set the Russian 
army apart internally from its western counterparts was the separate warrior caste of the 
Cossacks, who were generally employed as light cavalry and were especially useful for 
reconnaissance missions and harassment and pursuit of retreating foes. As Philip 
Longworth writes “[t]hey were the eyes and ears of the army, the screen which fanned 
out before the advancing regulars, the rearguard which covered their withdrawals, the 
pursuers and devastators of a retreating enemy.”114 The Cossack is the general 
designation for the people of the Don, Kuban, and Zaparozhye regions of modern day 
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Ukraine, and “their lands and liberties were granted them on condition of military 
service.”115
The conscription and the use of Cossacks that produced the quasi-national 
character of the eighteenth century Russian army solved two significant problems that 
plagued the armies of Western Europe. Unlike the small kingdom of Prussia or the island 
of Britain, Russia had no need for mercenary troops. This allowed it to save money and 
retain direct control over its military force. The second distinction, connected to the 
employment of mercenary troops, addressed the issue of desertion. As Walter Pintner 
concluded, “it seems reasonable to suppose that Russian soldiers were far less likely to 
desert than Western mercenaries. They were culturally isolated from their opponents, 
[and] they were accustomed to coercion whether they were serfs or soldiers.”116
The recruiting mechanism that brought all strands of military fabric into a solid 
whole was simple but often crude and inefficient. The delivery of raw recruits to the army 
was facilitated through numerous levies. According to Menning, there were 31 levies 
between 1762 and 1799. The total enlistment ratios fluctuated between one in five 
hundred to one in a hundred souls, depending on the years of war.117 The drawback of 
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this system was the quality of human resources into which it was able to tap. The village 
idiot, the sloth, the drunk and the womanizer would usually be sent off to the conscription 
centers. The most intelligent and hardworking serfs would usually be retained by country 
gentry to run their estates. Despite this obvious flaw, however, the levies were more than 
able to satisfy the increasing appetite of the young empire for cannon fodder. At the start 
of the Seven Years’ War this system had yielded over three hundred thousand troops, 
with field garrison forces numbering 172,440 men alone. By contrast, the whole French 
army amounted to slightly over two hundred thousand soldiers and the Prussia of 
Frederick the Great possessed armed forces of less than 150,000.118
Outwardly European-looking, the Russian army had retained much of its socio-
cultural character that set it apart from the French sans-culottes, the Prussian automatons, 
or the British redcoats. Comte Roger de Damas was one of the French aristocrats in the 
service of Catherine the Great in the late 1780s, and left an illuminating, if sometimes 
stereotypical, description of the Russians fighting the Ottomans. “The Russian army was 
greatly inferior in tactics to the armies of the other first-rate Powers,” wrote Damas. “This 
was especially true of the cavalry, which was positively ignorant; but the steadiness of 
the men in the ranks, their handling of arms, their deportment and discipline, were perfect 
to the last degree.” He concluded that “the inferiority of the Russian army in the matter of 
training is counterbalanced by its discipline and steadiness….”119 A modern historian 
supplements this view with a casual remark that despite a certain tactical awkwardness on 
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the battlefield, the Russian infantry possessed the enviable quality to “repel heavy attacks 
with great bravery and resolution.”120 Scotsman Paul Jones, the naval hero of the 
American Revolution who found himself unemployed after the war and who joined the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in late 1788, revealed another side of the Russian Imperial 
Armed Forces. His memoirs are dotted with frustrated lamentations about cruelties121 and 
endless intrigues122 that governed the activities of the Russian army and navy. 
Another interesting account was provided by Barnes Steveni, a British observer. 
He left the following description of the Russian soldiers:
As a rule the Russian conscript carries with him into the Army many 
of the best as well as the worst qualities; he remains careless, 
procrastinating, happy-go-lucky, slavish, superstitious and generally 
exceedingly ignorant. In fact, the majority of the recruits – about 70 
per cent – cannot read or write when they enter the Tsar’s service.
He then went on to clarify that 
Physically and mentally the soldiers and officers are equal, if not 
superior, to the Germans, and are brave to foolhardiness. But their 
want of training and education will be found, time after time, to 
place them at a great disadvantage with their more instructed 
Teutonic opponents…123
It was not the soldiers of Catherine the Great that the Englishman was writing about, but 
the Russian army on the eve of the First World War. Ostensibly, the fundamental traits 
that set the Russian military apart from those of the West persisted to the end of its 
establishment. Steveni might as well have been describing its eighteenth century 
predecessor.
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Despotic benevolence of Russian officers, agile and cunning Cossack 
horsemanship, combined with unrelenting determination of the serfs, proved an insoluble
mixture to its European and Ottoman opponents. The battle-hardened experience of the 
Prussians, the fanatical zeal of the Turkish janissaries124, and even the inextinguishable 
spirit of the French élan had all succumbed to the devouring of the Russian military 
machine. A strange creature by all accounts, harbouring many curious contradictions in 
its bosom to its very end, the Russian Imperial Army of the eighteenth century, according 
to some scholars, was “the most powerful ground force in Europe.”125
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I I
T H E  FAT H E R  O F R U S S I A N  M I L I TA RY 
T H O U G H T
“No one better than Rumyantsev knows
the inner workings of the military craft….”
Comte Alexandre Langeron, 1796
Peter Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev (1725-1796)126 was the first Russian military 
intellectual who attempted to grapple with the insurmountable challenges associated with 
developing a military theory suitable for the young and turbulent Russian Empire. A 
humanist, a scholar, and a soldier, Rumyantsev grew up under the strict eye of his father, 
a military man who was a benefactor of Peter I. Indeed, some legends maintain that the 
young Rumyantsev was actually an illegitimate child of that great monarch. The family 
was elevated to hereditary nobility in 1743, and the coat of arms of the House of 
Rumyantsevs reads in Latin Non Solum Armis or ‘Not by Arms Only.’ 127
The young Rumyantsev received his baptism of fire in the Seven Years’ War 
where he showed himself to be a capable and aggressive commander. As several Russian 
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historians have noted,128 despite Rumyantsev’s demonstrated military abilities and 
political experience there was personal animosity between him and Catherine II which 
complicated his military projects. Nonetheless, the empress fully understood 
Rumyantsev’s military talent and never underestimated his authority in the army. 
Catherine later appointed him the governor of modern-day Ukraine, where he 
significantly improved the economy and administration of the region129 before being 
recalled for another campaign against the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1768-1774, nicknamed Rumyantsev’s War, he won some of the most spectacular 
battles of the century, accelerating the geopolitical development and expansion of the 
Russian state in the south. In July of 1770 Rumyantsev crushed a hundred-and-fifty 
thousand130 strong Ottoman army with twenty-seven thousand Russian troops near the 
river of Kaluga, which earned him a Marshal’s baton. The following year he crossed the 
mighty Danube. In her correspondence with Voltaire, Catherine acknowledged the 
significance of the event. “Rejoice with me, monsieur Voltaire, on this occasion of the 
crossing of the Danube,” she wrote. “The feat is as striking as the crossing of the Rhine 
by Louis XIV, and even more impressive. According to the chronicles, for eight hundred 
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years the Russian army could not set foot on the other side of the Danube.”131
Rumyantsev’s campaign threatened the northern possessions of the Ottoman Empire, 
forcing the Turks to the negotiating table. Rumyantsev’s unprecedented victories,
coupled with his political shrewdness, gained him the title of Zadunaisky or ‘beyond the 
Danube.’ In 1774,  he presided over the Kuchuk-Kainarji peace treaty132 with the Porte, 
which had to cede numerous fortresses in the region, pay a tribute of 4.5 million roubles 
in reparations, and acknowledge Russia as a protectorate of the Crimea, Walachia, and 
Moldavia, while simultaneously granting Russian ships the right of passage through the 
Black Sea and the Straits.133
Rumyantsev’s greatest contribution to posterity, however, was his military 
thought. Early in his career Rumyantsev turned his sharp mind to the questions of 
military theory. As his secretary N. Lesnizkii recounted in 1787, Rumyantsev could write 
as fast as he could speak and “everything that touched the basis of any rules or 
regulations, especially military, was written by the hand of the commander.”134
Rumyantsev was a member of the nobility and his writing style reflected his place in 
Russian society. Complex and lengthy sentences, sprinkled with Russian renditions of 
foreign words, would be incomprehensible to anyone who did not belong to his socio-
economic class. This is important because the major function of his writing was to 
instruct the highest echelons of the military-political elite of his country. Indeed, some of 
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his tracts were even addressed to the Empress’ herself. He wrote militarily with 
significant nomenclature in his text, which serves as a primary example of Western 
influences. For instance, retirovat’sya meant “to retreat”, konfermatsia became “a 
confirmation”, and bataliia was “a battle” (which in modern Russian orthography is 
simply bitva).
Military Theory and Strategic Thought
Rumyantsev’s all-encompassing, rational mind served as an indispensable “channel, by 
which some of the most advanced military thinking of the West reached Russia,” and 
which in turn made him “the founder of a new military tradition which was to be 
developed in full by Potemkin and Suvorov.”135 A deep thinker, Rumyantsev always 
looked at the root of the problem and his holistic approach is evident in his thought. 
“Without Shuvalov’s136 dilettantism or Münnich’s137 despotism, [Rumyantsev] was able 
to solve all the different problems associated with development of the Russian armed 
forces,” wrote Kersnovsky.138  Rumyantsev’s influence and his status both within the 
military estate and the governing circles meant that his ideas had influential currency, 
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gradually shaping the Russian theory of war and, by extension, the manner of its 
execution.
Observations and experience led Rumyantsev to doubt the applicability of 
principles derived from western models and provoked him to introduce major shifts into 
Russian military doctrine, which some would see as a departure from the orthodoxy of 
Europe. First, he attacked the cordon strategy. In 1768, he wrote to the War Council 
(Voennaya Kollegia) in St. Petersburg that “in an attempt to cover vast land with small 
number of troops, the forces were spread in thin, which in the case of the enemy attack 
could not present a solid cordon...”139 Rumyantsev instead thought that small numbers of 
troops should be concentrated and never dispersed, and that the cordon system should be 
abandoned, especially as a defensive measure when fighting in the steppes. He therefore 
ordered the “regiments not to be fractured into such small parts, but to be maintained, as 
much as possible, the whole.”140
By dabbling in the system of disposition and challenging the western norms of 
military theory, Rumyantsev inevitably had to address the debate surrounding the 
offensive and defensive modes of warfare. In general, Rumyantsev believed that 
“attacking forces held a constant moral ascendancy over those that were defending”141
and therefore rejected the cordon system along with its western intellectual baggage, out 
of principle. In his report to the Empress in 1771 about the expeditionary corps for attack 
on Constantinople, Rumyantsev summed up his views about offensive and defensive 
strategies as follows:
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A commander conducting himself according to the rules of the 
former, has a single main objective to which all others are 
subordinated, and to which they flow with all determination. But in 
the defensive war, it is impossible to extract an objective of equal 
weight, for in this scenario all parts require numbers and vigilance 
which are subordinated to the actions of the foe.142
If the conduct of military operation was not to be dictated by the behaviour of the enemy, 
the Russian commanders had to take the reigns of active attack and tactical aggression. “I 
have always been of the opinion, and shall always remain of one, that the attacker to the 
very last is poised to win,” he asserted, “while the defender is always chained by fear, 
relative to the offensive power rushed at him.”143 With these few words, Rumyantsev
charted the path and directed Russian military thought for more than a quarter of a 
century. Offensive operations became the norm for the Russian armies. 
In the purely tactical realm, Rumyantsev’s innovations reflected the flexibility of 
Russian military thought that refused to conform to the conventions of the time and 
constantly sought improvements. In 1761, Rumyantsev encouraged one of his generals to 
experiment with the columns as opposed to linear formations. In July 1761 he wrote:
Every regiment (polk) can evolve into a column in the following 
manner: the two middle companies (divizióny), the last half from the
right flank, and from the left flank the first half, should move 
forward, with big steps; the rest of the companies from the right 
flank – move to the left, and the companies from the left flank –
move to the right, but facing straight, goose stepping, should move 
after the first ones, and so one half-company (odin poludivizion)
moves behind the first, and comes together from both sides forming 
into a whole.144
Rumyantsev went on to describe how to build columns out of four regiments and how to 
create a unified front from divisional columns. He remarked that this complicated tactical 
manoeuvre would often have to be performed under enemy fire, thus soldiers should 
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learn how to fire standing up, instead of kneeling down. This implied the necessity of 
drill. Reflective of the high degree of independence Rumyantsev prescribed to his 
officers, he left the employment of this tactic to the discretion of the Colonel.
In another letter, Rumyantsev contemplated the creation of light battalions during 
the last years of the Seven Years’ War. The recruitment of this kind of troops was a 
growing trend in the West at the time. As Colonel Andreas Emmerich, a participant of 
several partisan missions himself, wrote: “In war no army can act without light 
troops….Such light troops ought properly to be composed of select chasseurs145 with 
rifles, light infantry with bayonets, and light dragoons….”146 The Russians recognized 
this trend and in September 1761 Rumyantsev wrote to Major Miller:
In observing that the enemy’s light forces prevent our own from discovering or 
defeating them, I have found and collected some hunters…for incorporating them 
into our light forces. It is to you that I delegate to test them in combat, knowing 
your diligence and loyalty to the imperial service, and to determine what 
advantage the above could bring to the search and defence operations….147
As Duffy attests, this “mode of operation was so alien to the mentality of the times that 
Rumyantsev had to spell out the tactics very specifically.”148 Rumyantsev wrote that their 
equipment should be lightened – “they shall leave their swords behind, and instead take 
bayonets,” and the heavy grenadier bags should be exchanged for the ones borrowed 
from the musketeers. These light forces were to be commanded by regular infantry 
officers and were to be supported by light cannons.
The goal was to enable such battalions to conduct quick, guerrilla-like actions. 
Ambush, therefore, should be the primary mode of their offensive operations. Soldiers 
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should wait for the enemy in forests, small towns and on the roads. “Always imagining a 
greater force than it is in reality, [the enemy] could easily be turned to flight,” 
Rumyantsev pointed out.149 When in villages, these soldiers should never sleep in houses 
but rather in sheds and barns. To assure the operational flexibility and speed of 
movement for these tactical units, Rumyantsev was prepared to cut the umbilical cord 
that tied them to the cumbersome central command. He was an early proponent of the 
structural decentralization, but he would later realize that it too had limitations. In 
retrospect, Rumyantsev’s instructions to Major Miller were reminiscent of proto-partisan 
doctrine that would dominate under the aegis of the famous Colonel Denis Davydov in 
1812.150 However, it would be dangerous and ahistorical to maintain that Rumyantsev’s 
ideas were unique or ahead of the Western intellectual curve. Many works, including 
Emmerich’s book show, neither was the case. 
Rumyantsev’s evident departure from the strictures of the cordon system caused a 
chain reaction of adjustments that touched every aspect of conduct of war – theoretical 
and practical - within the Russian military establishment. With the new aggressive and 
flexible ideas emerged new theoretical problems that Rumyantsev had to accommodate in 
practice. Most fundamentally, the strategic objective of battle itself had changed because 
the offensive spirit of his theory gave military operations a different strategic purpose. As 
Rumyantsev was distancing himself from the cordon system, he was also departing from 
the objectives this system was designed to achieve. Instead of capturing and holding 
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fortresses and towns, his military theory dictated the destruction of human capital of 
enemy forces as the main goal of military operations.151 As Anatol Rapoport rightly 
remarks, since so much care and money went into training and equipment of an army, 
princes and generals were very reluctant to risk zero-sum military engagements.152  
Another study confirms that “[g]enerals were careful of their men, not necessarily out of 
humane, but at least out of economic motives.”153 Rumyantsev’s strategy preyed
precisely upon this factor. Thus a major paradigm shift had been affected in Russian 
military thought in the late 1760s that would be taken up and exploited ruthlessly by 
Suvorov and subsequent commanders. The complete annihilation of the enemy’s means 
to resist inexorably led to the occupation of its territory and to the conclusion of the war, 
Rumyantsev insisted.
This new curve in strategic calculation led to a new concept: zakreplenie, or 
consolidation.154 Rumyantsev’s thought held it imperative to consolidate first and to 
conquer second, which becomes a point of contradiction within his theory of war. If an 
attempt is made to thoroughly consolidate the ground covered, it will inevitably slow 
down the impetus of the offensive, reduce the concentrated forces to garrison duties, and 
inevitably dissolve the centralized units into a cordon. Even though Rumyantsev clearly 
understood the weakness of the linear systems of combat, he nonetheless was unable to 
get rid of them completely. The line still retained its potency as it could deliver a 
powerful, concentrated volley of fire across a long front. This worked especially well 
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with disciplined troops who could reload quickly and aim accurately. Therefore, the Field 
Marshal strove to combine the two practices in his campaigns. To avoid the inconsistency 
of his own theoretical principles, Rumyantsev prudently employed new formations, 
notably divisional squares, while at the same time never rejecting the cordon altogether -
he recognized that it still had its use on a tactical level. During the war with the Turks, 
Rumyantsev would actually unite divisional kares with a cordon line reinforced by 
artillery and cavalry units.155 Avoiding dogmas, he was thus able to achieve an eclectic 
assimilation of western practices with Russian military needs.
To achieve his strategic goals under the rubric of the new offensive model, the 
practice of manoeuvre also had to evolve. Rumyantsev’s views about the role and 
purpose of manoeuvring in the theatre of war were diametrically opposite to the views 
held in the West. According to Klokman, Western military thought saw manoeuvre as a 
means to attain goals of war and not as a method of combat.156 The concept of manoeuvre 
was traditionally used to threaten the lines of communication to endanger enemy supply 
networks and other areas of strategic importance, thus forcing the enemy to retreat. 
Rumyantsev, on the other hand, looked at the theory behind manoeuvre as not an end in 
itself but rather as one of the ways of putting one’s forces in a comparative advantage vis-
à-vis the enemy. The aim was to restrict freedom of actions available to the opponent, 
chaining his movement and undermining his will to fight, forcing him to accept battle in 
the unfavourable to him circumstances, and thus crushing the human infrastructure of his 
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army.157 This eloquently complemented Rumyantsev’s core ideas about the goal of 
military operations.
When Mathew Anderson wrote that “strategy and military thinking generally 
were still based mainly on ideas of limited war, of caution and avoidance of the 
uncertainties of great pitched battles,” 158 he accurately captured the general mood in 
eighteenth century Europe. Staying true to his theories, Rumyantsev could not accept this 
line of thought. Rumyantsev tried to reverse this Western trend in the Russian conduct of 
war, since it could not accommodate his insistence on the tactical destruction and 
operational annihilation of enemy forces as a principal pre-condition to strategic victory. 
The only means to bring this about was through exploiting battlefield successes by 
energetic pursuit of the defeated enemy to obliterate his existence piecemeal. He knew 
that armies were expensive, training took time, and without soldiers the other contender 
could not continue military operations. In the last campaign of the second Russo-Turkish 
war in 1774, Rumyantsev chastised one of the generals for his inability to rout the Turks 
after the victory at Kaludza and to push forward on their defences. “On the one hand I am 
happy with the victory over the enemy,” he wrote to General Mikhail Kaminski, “on the 
other – it is not without regret that I meet the news that you, after completely defeating 
the enemy, procrastinated…exploiting your victory.” Rumyantsev warned that “while 
you have stopped, the enemy can regroup and revive his forces, and improve his defences 
in the fortress; not days, but hours and moments in this situation are lost beyond 
recovery.”159
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Pursuit and rout – quintessential parts of Russian military theory by the end of the 
century – were also strongly expressed in the West. For instance, the English military 
theorist, Henry Lloyd, thought that pursuit of the retreating enemy is central to strategic 
victory. “For my part,” he wrote, “I should…pursue the enemy with my whole army, and 
attack one or the other of his columns with my principal force, while the remainder 
should be employed in harassing the others.”160 Frustrations expressed by Rumyantsev 
about the waste of valuable time could also be found in the works of Lloyd who warned, 
“time is everything in war, and nothing makes you lose it so much as delays….”161
Thus all strands of Rumyantsev’s thought come together. The offensive actions of 
tactical flexibility, supported by consolidation of strategic objectives and aggressive 
manoeuvring culminating in pursuit and destruction of life resources of the enemy,
became inextricably contingent upon a high degree of initiative. This was precisely what 
Rumyantsev had always sought from his subordinates. The idea of independent thought 
in lower levels of command had a broader connotation for the development of Russian 
military theory in general. There was always a struggle to loosen the grip of schematic 
planning of the ‘armchair strategists’ and transfer the decision-making to the hands that 
toil the ground of war. Rumyantsev maintained that no plans can be made accurate to the 
minute, since even the best calculations are prone to breakdown in the heat of battle. In 
October 1773, he wrote to St. Petersburg, advising his empress about the upcoming 
Turkish campaign. In his letter he descried what Clausewitz would later term ‘the fog of 
war’ and ‘friction’:
Plans, usually developed at the beginning of a war or campaign for 
agreeable direction and cooperation, offered from different and 
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distant places or generally from allies, often happen to undergo 
changes; with the approach to the enemy further actions should be 
invested in the art of the commander who will judge the situation 
according to time and circumstance.162
It is worth emphasising that these notions were paramount in Clausewitz’s military 
philosophy and that the Russian thought articulated them some sixty years before Vom 
Krieg appeared on the bookshelves of Berlin. Unfortunately for Rumyantsev, the sombre 
political realities of his time could not accommodate this idea. His request to grant more 
freedom to commanders in the field from the highly centralized Russian bureaucracy and 
the jealous court in the capital had a hollow resonance in imperial hallways. The control 
of the armies and the direction of the campaign were in the iron grip of the ruling party at 
the court.
Even though Rumyantsev had come to his conclusions by patient and calculated 
observations of his trade, independently of Western influences, it does not necessarily 
signify that his ideas were different or avant-garde, as virtually all Soviet scholars claim. 
For instance, Henry Lloyd drew similar derivative observations by dwelling on the 
lessons of the Seven Years’ War, and subsequently related his thought about the fog of 
war. Lloyd wrote: “Whatever is possible, a general should think probable, and take his 
measures accordingly, that like old women he may not say; who would have thought 
it?”163 The idea that flexibility was natural and improvisation was indispensable to battle
was also thoroughly understood by military theoreticians in the West.
On a more tactical level, Rumyantsev’s input into the development of strategic 
interaction among separate military detachments deserves special attention. To transform 
the above highly theoretical rhetoric into a practical application, a change had to be 
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precipitated on the tactical level. The cordon could not accommodate strategic objectives 
of Rumyantsev’s thought, since they required more flexibility on the battlefield than that 
system could provide. According to the Western thinking behind the cordon, its purpose 
was to provide safe communications among forces, allies, and supplies. Consequently, 
upsetting the cordon at any one of its points usually led to the disruption of the whole 
manoeuvre and movement of an army, forcing the suspension of military operations or a 
retreat. Russian military theory preferred to dismember the continuous string of the 
cordon into several parts of divisional size so that if one part became overwhelmed 
during the attack, the offensive could still proceed. Defeat or destruction of one part of 
the force would not seal the fate of the entire army. 
What tactical solution could have contained such a diverse group of theoretical 
pre-requisites? Rumyantsev attempted to solve this problem in his first war with the 
Turks. He needed to design a new system for the 
disposition of troops that would allow him to secure his 
strategic goals and at the same time be resilient to the 
numerous cavalry of the Crimean Khans, Tatars, and 
other nomads in the Ottoman service, an enemy very
different from the Prussian infantry. His search led him to 
a simple conclusion: what Folard has labelled the “the 
hollow Square of the Moderns.”164 By bending the line 
into a self-enclosed square he made it an interchangeable, independent part of an 
offensive mechanism.165 Under his guidance, Russian battlefields began to be dotted with 
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kare (Figure 4), or hollow squares, as opposed to the familiar lines of the Seven Years’ 
War.
There were practical and psychological benefits offered by the square that a 
tactical cordon could never provide.  Andrew Roberts offers an insightful analysis of this 
particular formation during the Battle of Waterloo. “Horses will refuse to charge straight 
at a body of men who are pointing bayonets at them,” he writes. “This is equine fact 
underlying the thinking behind the defensive formation known as the ‘square’.” 166 It 
provided a concentrated fire at a specific point of a cavalry charge from every direction, 
without exposing the flanks or the rear of the troops. Furthermore, the efficiency of aim 
was no longer necessary in this kind of combat. All the Russians had to do was aim at the 
horses in the first wave of the attack, which would collapse and fall, breaking the 
cohesion and determination of the charge. Finally, on a psychological level, kare gave an 
air of safety to the men inside the squares who knew “that their backs were protected by 
their comrades.”167 Rumyantsev’s kare had the same “murderous effect”, to use Robert’s 
phrase, as Wellington’s squares at the Battle of Waterloo. The only antidote to the stoic 
character of the kare was a well directed and maintained cannon fire. Russian infantry 
was rarely in danger from artillery, however, as this was not a Turkish forte.168 Thus by 
resorting to the square, Rumyantsev was able to satisfy all the criteria of his military 
theory. 
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His thought, woven into careful comprehension of the military texture of the war 
in the East, would ultimately manifest itself on the dusty battlefields of the Southern 
Ukraine. There, Rumyantsev combined both systems and fused them into an impressive 
offensive force where he connected several kares with the cordon, integrating artillery 
and cavalry into the movable formation, and making it a mutually supportive structure.169
“The brilliant examples of Rumyantsev’s active strategic offensive,” writes Klokman, 
“directed at the destruction of the human capital of the enemy, were his famous victories 
over numerically superior forces in battles of Ryaboya Mogila, near Larga and Kagul in 
the campaign of 1770.”170 Furthermore, by fracturing the line into divisional components 
Russian forces could march separately but fight together. For instance, the march from 
Hotina to Ryaboya Mogila and Larga in the campaign of 1770 was conducted by three 
separated groups of forces that came together before the battle in the pre-arranged place 
at a set time.171 This practice became widespread in the West at the end of the eighteenth
and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries during the French Revolutionary Wars.
On a strategic level, the rejection of the cordon system meant a total 
reorganization of border security in Southern Russia. When Rumyantsev became general-
governor of Malorossiya (Ukraine) in 1767, he dismantled the previously used system 
and replaced it with the one of “strong points” (opornye punkty) supported by active, 
movable forces. The political side-effect of his reform led to increased centralization of 
the province, which in return made it easy for the imperial center to govern the region.172
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As a veteran of the Seven Years’ War, Rumyantsev was aware of the armature of 
the theoretical debates that followed in the wake of the Prussian victories. Residing on 
the intellectual periphery of Europe he did not contribute to them directly, but 
nonetheless firmly placed his flag in the camp of opposition to the scientific school of 
warfare. Rumyantsev never felt comfortable with geometric and scientific approaches to 
war that were being generated by Guibert, Lloyd, and von Bülow. In 1769 he wrote to 
Count Panin:
Our trade has its rules, but they are in many cases indeterminate, and 
devoid of concrete substance and precision, for they proceed 
essentially from the judgement of the commander. What the whole 
art of war comes down to is this…to hold the main objection of the 
war constantly in view, to be aware of what proved useful or 
damaging in similar cases in past times (giving due weight to the lie 
of the ground and the associated advances and difficulties), and to 
evaluate the enemy by working out what we might do if we were in 
his place.173
In other words, the most simplistic deduction of his principles states that it is important 
to: (1) know what the war is being fought over and to avoid war for war’s sake; (2) keep 
precedent in mind and learn from history, broadly interpreted; and (3) finally approach 
military problems through gaining a deeper understanding of what the enemy desires to 
achieve in his campaign. Evidently, Rumyantsev saw little science in his profession and 
his writings appear to illustrate that he gravitated away from the positivist analysis of 
war.  He emphasized human imperative in military conflicts, illustrated foremost by the 
necessity to cultivate individual initiative in his soldiers. 
One of Rumyantsev’s most significant contributions to the development of 
Russian military thought came at the juncture of war and political theory. He was among 
the first of the eighteenth century military elite to tie warfare closer to the more rational 
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demands of geopolitical considerations of the state. In so doing, he interpreted the act of 
war, as Duffy writes, in an almost Clausewitzian fashion. The embryonic notion that a 
military conflict was just one piece of the political calculus, and does not constitute an 
end in itself, was already evident in Russian military thought as early as 1771, when 
Rumyantsev wrote to Count Panin: 
A man who simply looks at what lies immediately before his eyes 
will be unable to see what advantages may derive from the 
perception of the less obvious attendant circumstances. I could easily 
go astray if I left myself in ignorance of the political side of affairs, 
for this lays down the guidelines for the military aspect.174
Even though Rumyantsev was a product of his time and his analysis lacked both 
the sophistication and intellection of later Clausewitzian thought, his views on war and 
politics, with assignation of the leading role to the former, were still quite impressive. 
When he was actively campaigning against the Turks three years later, he tried not to lose 
sight of political developments. He asked Catherine to inform him about:
the intentions of the allies and other monarchies, and the tasks that 
will be assigned to your other land forces and the navy; for without 
this knowledge I can not understand the military situation beyond 
what I see in my own immediate locality; and my actions here, 
without doubt, should coincide with all the others, and it easier to 
achieve this when the general picture is known.175
His understanding of divisional interaction transpired to the strategic plane of cooperation 
between armies. In the campaign of 1770 he sought combined actions with the army of 
Peter Panin. The following year he kept up a steady correspondence with General 
Dolgorukov and his forces and even made himself aware of the plans of the Russian 
fleet.176 In 1774, during the heat of operations against the Turks, he ordered General 
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Saltykov to establish communications with the corps of General Kaminski for 
cooperative actions in the future.177
The need for a broad comprehension of the military situation and the necessity to 
subordinate war to the political will was clear enough to Rumyantsev. Looking outside 
the immediate military situation and considering the demands of the whole theatre of 
operations was the cornerstone for any strategic success. Rumyantsev therefore should be 
credited with the efforts to articulate and integrate political consideration into Russian 
military thought and to show the importance of this assimilation. That is not to say that 
the similar realizations were absent from the minds of Lloyd or the Old Fritz, both of 
whom realized the importance of this aspect in conduct of successful coalition-based 
warfare. 
His scepticism of Western military practices, his rejection of the cordon strategy, 
and the broad scope of his theory would give birth to the undying thesis in the Russian 
and Soviet historiography, which postulated Rumyantsev as the founder of uniquely 
Russian, national, military art. The Russian insistence that he had developed a mode of 
warfare distinctly different from the West (and as some would argue, superior to the 
West) is an attractive oversimplification. An appraisal of the major cabal of his writings 
would indicate that the hyperbolic assumptions of the Russian scholarship do not 
withstand the scrutiny of closer examination. As Marc Raeff points out, “men whose 
entire existential framework was determined by state service and whose home and school 
experiences fostered rootlessness and insecurity were bound to perceive and adapt 
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Western culture and ideas in a particular, idiosyncratic way.”178 This does not mean, 
however, that through the process of trans-cultural assimilation Western ideas had 
somehow became ‘Russian.’
On the contrary, at the fundamental level, these ideas still remained the brain-
child of the West, as did their Russian authors. For instance, Rumyantsev was a great 
admirer of the Old Fritz and the ‘Prussian model’. He was educated in the “Germanizing 
period of [Empress] Anna” 179 and as a young man did a stint of service in the Prussian 
army before he was extradited back to Russia by his father. According to contemporaries,
Rumyantsev always felt an attachment to the Prussian nation.180 His tactical innovations 
during the Seven Years’ War were inspired as much by his own talents as by the enemy.
His light battalions came as a response to the Prussian flexibility. Even the kare
formation was not the result of some intellectual concoction on Rumyantsev’s part, or 
any other Russian commander for that matter. It was a rational response to the conditions 
of war that were very different from the West. The experimentation with new orders of 
battle originated from the nature of the enemy the Russians found in the Ottoman armies, 
not from the inherent uniqueness of their thought. Unlike in Western Europe, where 
infantry was the primary mode of conducting an attack, the Turks relied on horsepower. 
Possessing numerous cavalry forces, the Turkish hordes broke through extended 
European-style cordons and rendered them useless. Austrians who spread their forces and 
their striking power, “found that the enemy wiped them out piecemeal.”181 Thus, in many 
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aspects of its development, Russian thought was a reaction to external pressures. Rather 
than being a stroke of genuine originality, its sum product increasingly resembled 
Western patterns.
Instead of consciously developing a ‘Russian Model’, Rumyantsev 
subconsciously synthesized many of the western theories and adapted them to the 
requirements of peculiarities of the Russian military experience. In the process, he pushed 
the western ideas further up their evolutionary path as a response to Russian necessities in 
war against numerous and obstreperous neighbours. 
Administrative and Organizational Theory
Curiously, in his first major work composed in 1770 - Customs of Military Service
(Obryad Sluzhby), Rumyantsev did not address the topics of tactics, strategy and war 
directly, but rather concentrated his attention on administrative vectors.182 The text is 
divided into twelve chapters and covers everything from how to feed the horses to what a 
soldier had to do to relieve himself on the march. The text explains how to take care of 
weapons and magazines, how to perform guard duties around the camp, and outlines 
general responsibility for everyone in the army - from a private to a general officer. It is 
not so much a battlefield manual as a description of intricacies of camp life. As such, it 
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serves not only as an indispensable source of anthropology of military life, but also as a 
valuable source for the cultural and social history of eighteenth century Russia. Without 
digressing from the context of the present inquiry, of particular interest becomes what 
this seemingly cultural, at times narrow and detailed writing can disclose about the trends 
in the military thought of early Imperial Russia. Besides the obvious attention of the text 
to governing and supplying a military camp, its chapters also reveal a strong 
preoccupation with sanitation, hospitals (lazarety), civil-military relations, and even 
prayer.183 Picking up his favourite topic of proper camp hygiene, Rumyantsev even 
described proper measures to be taken against the disposal of human waste. To avoid 
cholera and other viral and bacterial related diseases, proper sewage treatment was 
necessary, especially in a crowded space containing tens of thousands of soldiers. 
Rumyantsev’s solution was simple. Every infantry company and every cavalry squadron, 
before entering camp, had to dig out a deep hole covering it with hay on all sides. In the 
summer heat, old ones had to be filled back in with earth and new holes dug out every 
day. “The new ones should be dug out in behind the old ones in a straight line,” 
Rumyantsev wrote, adding a stroke of his organizational brilliance to the whole affair. As 
far as cavalry was concerned, the drinking places for the horses should always be located 
below the camp, downstream, so that the people would have clean water and in the hot 
summer days could go for a swim.
Rumyantsev never failed to touch upon civil-military relations in his writings. 
Visitors to the camp from the nearby towns should be greeted with a respectful and 
friendly disposition and care should be given to protect them from harm and offences and 
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keep them always “in cordial caution.”184 When looking for forage for the horses in 
villages, soldiers should never bring the animals into barns so as not to disturb the 
inhabitants, but bring the forage outside. To ensure that nothing besides forage was taken 
from the civilians, “guards should be put in the villages and sentries should be kept near 
village exits,” 185 added Rumyantsev.
When Rumyantsev turned his attention to describe medical services, he wrote that 
“nobody deserves more attention than the sick soldier, with whose rest and convenience 
all administrators (chiny) should be concerned.” He reminded readers that during a march 
the wounded and the sick should be shielded from the rain, cold, and heat. In the villages 
they should be put in barns and not in the houses, so not to disturb the villagers, and in 
the camps they should be placed in dry places with clean air. Medics should visit their 
patients daily.186
Rumyantsev also recognized the importance of religious services, prayer and 
ceremony to the superstitious peasant-recruits. Upon arrival to the prayer at nine in the 
morning, he noted that the officers should not bring any weapons but their swords. The 
ceremony should be conducted in a circle led by a priest, with attendees kneeling on one 
knee. On special occasions, even churches were to be erected in the middle of 
brigades.187
Six years after Rumyantsev wrote Customs of Military Service, it was accepted as 
a manual and institutional framework for the whole Russian army. The Military 
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Collegiate, headed by Catherine’s most influential favourite, Prince Potemkin, sent the 
empresses the following letter in October 1776. It read that Rumyantsev’s customs were:
derived from real experience, with some changes in the training 
(ekserzizii), currently in use, and with valuable additions to the 
customs of service itself that were previously lacking…..The 
additions made by him to the custom of service, and the changes to 
the training, coming as they did from practice, are recognized as 
quite applicable and for the army, quite necessary; thus the 
Collegiate brings before your highness to consider the memorable 
Customs of Military Service...and asks the permission that the whole 
army should be based on the above mentioned…188
It remained a standard read for the Russian officers and a guideline to maintaining 
military bases in Russia and abroad for twenty years. In a way, by adopting the main 
tenants of Rumyantsev’s writings, the Russian army embraced many of the Western ideas 
that were encapsulated in his thought.
Rumyantsev’s last and arguably most philosophical contribution to the Russian 
military thought came in the summer of 1777 in his Mysl’ (Thought). If Customs dealt 
with mundane directives of micro-management of military life, Mysl’ was definitely a 
teleological text. In its pages, Rumyantsev tried to coalesce his hitherto abstract notions 
of theory and practice of war, which appeared sporadically in his correspondence, into a 
comprehensible group of principles and codify them in one holistic text. Written for the 
Russian court (and Catherine in particular), the opening page of this overlooked work
reads: 
The military institution, which is different from all others, has
become simultaneously indispensable to all the states, according to 
some European views; however, due to the inequalities in physical 
and moral sense, they could not have been in either quantity nor 
quality similar to one another, and as states have discovered that the 
army is a burden on all other components of the state, they now are 
striving to employ all means to improve the connections among 
them, in which endeavour one country has done better than the rest. 
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Since we, due to the extensive territory, mixed and for the most part 
wicked neighbours, and sectarian and customary differences of our 
inhabitants, are least comparable with other states, we should expand 
as much as it is beneficial and advantageous for us and imitate others 
only to the extent that it suits our needs.189
This surprisingly insightful observation points to the degree of self-awareness in Russian 
military thought. Rumyantsev understood that Russia possessed a different political and 
social composition from the rest of Europe and therefore could not wholeheartedly adopt 
the Western way of war. Accordingly, Russian geo-political expansion could and should 
be maintained only if the benefits of conquests outweighed the drawbacks of 
administration of and military investment into new regions. More than anything, it was 
the political relevance that Rumyantsev gave to military projects that defined his military 
theory and, by extension, imprinted Russian military thought.
He proceeded to elucidate and develop further his ideas about the interaction 
between the politics and war, merging the two to serve military goals. Even when the full 
title of the text submitted to Catherine is considered, Thoughts on Organization of the 
Military Part (chasti voinskoi), it had something of a hidden intimation that betrayed 
what Rumyantsev thought of things military. Imbedded therein is an implicit acceptance 
that war is just a part of the greater whole, and cannot be examined in a vacuum if 
anything of value is to be derived from its purpose. In the introduction Rumyantsev 
warned that it is important:
to respect the source, which for now only one we have, that sustains 
our armed forces: by this I mean the people, who supply the army 
with soldiers and money, and who should not be exhausted by way 
of unreasonable and unbearable requisitions; and we should take 
such measures that would find us, in the time of need, with surplus in 
money and forces without experiencing any discomfort.190
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Rumyantsev was the first Russian commander since Peter the Great (who looked at the 
military business from the government’s point of view) who did not offer the one-
dimensional perspective exhibited by many military men. His vision of military theory 
forced officers to confront political reality. For instance, as Kersnovsky noted,
Rumyantsev “points at the necessity to maintain the equilibrium between military 
expenditure and other government needs,” 191 because the well-being of the army depends 
on the well-being of the populace. Population driven to poverty and deprived of food, 
farms robbed of the men through recruitment, and stables stripped of their horses for 
cavalry could never support a significant and prolonged war effort. Rumyantsev wanted 
his country to avoid the French exhaustion after the War of Spanish Succession. While 
Rumyantsev thought that regiments should be maintained at full strength during peace 
time, soldiers should spend only nine months a year in the army so that during the 
summer they could go home and work their fields. People with skills, such as carpenters 
and blacksmiths, should be retired yearly to their villages to attend to local needs and to 
make up for whatever was broken or used up during the year. In this way, roughly a third 
of the army was to be rotated every year.192 In essence what Rumyantsev was suggesting 
to Catherine was equivalent to what a modern military theorist would call a rudimentary 
organization of a ‘home front.’
In its basic constitution, Mysl’ reiterates all the points of concern to Rumyantsev, 
including discipline and military police, soldiers’ pay and rations, armaments, uniforms, 
recruitment, promotions, and cleanliness. Furthermore, Rumyantsev’s views on the utility 
of fortifications provide a vivid theoretical connection to some of the ideas expressed in 
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the West by such writers as de Saxe and Frederick II. In Reveries, de Saxe analyzed the 
war based on seigecraft. “It seems to me that what I have said should demonstrate the 
irremediable defects of fortified cities, and that it is more advantageous for a ruler to 
establish his strong points in localities aided by nature, and situated to cover country, than 
to fortify cities at immense expense or to augment their fortifications.”193 Rumyantsev’s 
thought followed de Saxe’s analytical pattern. Rumyantsev thought that fortresses and 
citadels should be maintained “for guarantee of inner security”.194 He maintained, 
however, that the existence of fortifications should correspond to the layout of the 
borders and their preservation, on circumstances at hand. “All those fortresses,” 
Rumyantsev wrote, “that due to changes in circumstances and borders were rendered 
unnecessary and yearly consume a large sum of money for upkeep, should be 
destroyed.”195 Just like with the cordon system, Rumyantsev never abandoned the use of 
fortresses. In Rumyantsev’s thought, fortresses acquired theoretical properties that made 
them compatible with his highly flexible and offensively-minded military doctrine. 
Rumyantsev’s view on foreign servicemen in the Russian army, which he kept 
well hidden at most times, were in conflict with the cosmopolitan spirit of eighteenth
century European nobility. Even though he slightly bemoaned the status of foreigners in 
the Russian army, Rumyantsev knew that in some ways their skill and expertise were 
indispensable. He admitted that Russia possessed a low number of men of knowledge, 
“scientists and skilful workers necessary for the armed forces.”196 At the same time he 
believed that officers from the West could be eventually replaced by indigenously 
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cultivated talent. To remedy the dependence on foreign intellect, he encouraged “the 
creation of military institutions of highest foundations, under the titles of schools of 
military science, art, and crafts, in major and other cities of every region…”197 Following 
in the footsteps of his namesake, Rumyantsev wanted more military academies to educate 
future generations of the Russian officer corps instead of sending them to Berlin, Vienna, 
Paris or London. Based on his previous experience, and by touching on almost all pillars 
of military art and reconciling them with the politics of the state, Rumyantsev reached a 
theoretical threshold in Mysl’ which would remain unsurpassed until the late Napoleonic 
era.
Assessing Rumyantsev’s Theories
In retrospect, Rumyantsev’s strategic theory, even though he never expressed it explicitly 
in writing, can be summarized in six distinct but inter-related points:
1. Destruction of human resources of the enemy – the main 
goal of war.
2. Success in war can only be achieved through relentless 
and active offence.
3. Total obliteration of enemy forces is attained in a pitched 
battle that must be sought for this purpose.
4. All the matters relating to command of the armies, 
organizations of the rears and operations in the field must 
be subordinate to achieving the main goal of war.
5. There is a link between war and politics, where the 
former takes precedent over the latter.
6. Emphasis on camp hygiene and soldier welfare. 
If the ideas cocooned in Rumyantsev’s thought are related back to the West, they become 
remarkably attendant to the principles developed by European writers and the behaviour 
of the Western armies. The destruction of the enemy was epitomized by the French 
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Revolutionary warfare, and the spirit of the offensive was both present in Folard’s and 
Frederick’s earlier writings (before the King grew old and cautious). The idea of pitched 
battle was not very popular in practice, but several theorists including de Saxe hinted at 
its efficacy. Finally, the necessity to consider political objectives in war had been 
expounded by both British and Prussian writers. 
In the 1780s, Rumyantsev’s authority and his sway over the Russian court began 
to wane. Even though his ascendancy was short lived and his influence was restricted to a
period of less than two decades, Rumyantsev’s intellectual efforts and military feats left a 
lasting impression. His work, on and off the battlefield, evolved the Russian military 
establishment into a more aggressive and sharper tool of foreign policy. By the habitual 
lecturing of his sovereign in his reports, Rumyantsev equipped the Russian army with 
theoretical knowledge that ensured its further development. In some instances his ideas 
present curious clusters of nascent Clausewitzian thought, while in others a seeming 
departure from the accepted norms.198 He put Russian military thought on a more 
confident footing, and painted it with a broad brush of Russian cultural idiosyncrasy, thus 
giving it an air of distinctive uniqueness. This sudden change in the theoretical 
demeanour, strikingly illustrated on the battlefield, provoked the claims that Rumyantsev 
developed a genuinely Russian way of war. Even if this assumption is sometimes taken 
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out of context, Rumyantsev still managed to knit several important strings of theory into 
the fabric of Russian military craft. Under minute orders stemming from the restless pen 
of the Field Marshal, staff work improved, control of the Russian forces strengthened,
and cooperation among different branches of the army matured. 
The stylistic trait that made Rumyantsev’s writings so authoritative was the 
inherently descriptive nature of the text. He walked a fine line between Frederick the 
Great’s blind prescription in Instructions and the didactic description of de Saxe’s 
Reveries. In nearly all of Rumyantsev’s orders is imbedded a clear explanation of his 
decision and why such a course had to be taken. At the same time, his orders usually left 
room for private initiative. His orders, “systematically outlining the tasks of each element 
of the army,” 199 improved its performance and harmonized the military bureaucracy. 
Constant attention was paid both to civil-military relations and care for the human 
capital of the Russian armies. The gradual abandonment of the cordon system coupled 
with Rumyantsev’s injection of political considerations into the art of war marked him as 
one of the central figures in the development of Russian military thought. As Duffy 
concludes, “[t]his remarkable man represented probably the most important single 
formative influence on the Russian army in the second half of the eighteenth century.”200
Rumyantsev’s last project was directed at the reform that would divide Russian 
armed forces in four different but interconnected parts: ground forces, comprising active 
armies; garrison forces – whose primary duty was to be the defence of strategic fortresses
and which could join ground forces if necessary; provincial (gubernskie) forces to 
perform strictly guard and sentry duties (a kind of regional proto-police force); and 
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finally the reserves, where new recruits would be trained for the ground forces of active 
armies. History, however, denied him the opportunity and time to put his designs into
practice. Rumyantsev was too distracted by the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire
and when they were brought to conclusion “on the northern horizon there already 
appeared the shining star of Potemkin…”201 He was ousted by the jealous favourite of 
Catherine the Great and spent the remainder of his days in idleness on his estate in 
Ukraine. Rumyantsev’s ideas lived on, however, and were picked up by the most 
eccentric of his pupils, Alexander Suvorov.
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I I I
T H E  S U VO R I A N  E P I L O G U E
  “Suwarrow chiefly was on the alert,
        Surveying, drilling, ordering, jesting, pondering;
    For the man was, we safely may assert,
         A thing to wonder at beyond most wondering;
    Hero, buffoon, half-demon, and half-dirt.”
Byron, Don Juan, Canto VII, LV
If Rumyantsev’s efforts are comparable to the steady build up of a theoretical edifice, 
then the contributions of Alexander Suvorov202 represent a whirlwind of tactical theory 
and soldier pedagogy. The persona, or rather the behaviour, of Field Marshal Suvorov is 
even more importance than that of Rumyantsev. In the words of one foreign observer, 
Suvorov’s “gross and ridiculous manners have inspired his soldiers with the blind 
confidence, which serves him instead of his military talents, and has been the real cause 
of all his successes.”203 Suvorov’s social conduct was so closely entwined with his ability 
to win battles that it eventually became the cornerstone of his military success; and, in
some instances, a point of criticism. Regardless of how Suvorov has been portrayed by 
his contemporaries or in subsequent Western and Russian historiography, the reader is 
well advised to keep Suvorov at the center of the narrative when surveying his military 
works. His unique methods only worked for Suvorov, since no one could replicate his 
energies, his crude style, or relate to regular soldiers as he did. As Catherine’s 
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preponderant favourite and Suvorov’s perennial rival,204 Prince Georgii Potemkin, joked, 
“You can’t oversuvorov Suvorov.”205
Alexander Vasil’yevich Suvorov (1729-1800) was born into lesser gentry who 
benefited from the Petrine reforms. He received an education through a tutor, probably 
his father,206 which was complimented by his personal quest for universal military 
knowledge. He spoke French, German, and Russian and, in the course of his long career, 
he added Polish and Turkish to his linguistic arsenal. Suvorov was an avid reader of 
history and biographies of great men, as well as of books about military sciences such as 
siege engineering and artillery.207 The military writers in the West were influnced by the 
exploits of the classical age, and Suvorov was similarly fascinated by the ancients. He 
read Plutack, Plato, and Cornelius Nepos,208 and was a great admirer of Julius Ceasar. He 
encouraged others to read the works of Charles XII, Montecuccoli, Princes Condé, 
Eugene and Turenne and Marshal de Saxe.209
Suvorov’s military promotion was slow, as he neither purchased his rank nor 
enjoyed favours from above.  He achieved the rank of Field Marshal at the respectable 
age of sixty-five entirely due to merit, which was rare in eighteenth century armies.210
Like many prominent people of his day, he was a freemason and belonged to the Russian 
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Masonic movement.211 By the end of his career Suvorov was regardered as one of the 
most educated officers in Europe and as “one of the most cultured men of his time.”212
His superb theoretical education was complimented by harsh experience. His life 
coincided with six major wars: the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the Polish Civil War 
(1768-1776), the First Turkish War (1768-1774), the Second Turkish War (1787-1792), 
the Polish Revolt (1793-1794), and the War of the Second Coalition  (1798-1800). 
His notoriously strange behaviour and character, sometimes bordering on 
madness, did not help to improve his standing with the elite. For example, Suvorov hated 
mirrors and everywhere he stayed they had to be covered. The manner in which he 
dressed and conducted himself verged on the scandalous.213 Even as a Generalissimo he 
wore the simplest clothes and his numerous medals could only rarely be seen on his 
chest. He preferred to sleep on a haystack and eat simple meals with the soldiers. 
Suvorov was relatively short, thin and often ill. As Duffy describes him: “His shoulders 
and arms were heavy, but he walked as if he were about to break into a dance – and 
indeed he had a way of surprising the most solemn companies by doing just that.”214 To 
his soldiers Suvorov asked the strangest questions, such as ‘what is the distance to the 
moon,’ ‘how many stars are there in the sky,’ or ‘how many fish are there in the Danube,’
and expected a ready reply.215 It was not the correct answer Suvorov was looking for; 
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rather, he was testing the wit of his men and how well they responded in unfamiliar 
situations. When the answer he received was ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I can’t remember,’
Suvorov would loose self-control and spit verbal fireballs at his men. His preferred insult, 
one that his men feared even more than court-martials, was nemoguznaika or 
‘dontknower.’216
Despite what many contemporaries thought, his ‘insanity’ was not random but 
methodical and controlled. As Christopher Duffy explains: “Those who knew Suvorov 
were aware that he was not the lunatic he pretended to be.” He continues to say that 
Suvorov’s strange behaviour was a psychological “device to disarm potential enemies in 
the army and at court.” 217 Through his bizarre conduct and strange language, Suvorov 
could convey sharp criticisms or telling lessons that otherwise would have not been 
allowed to be uttered. Yet, this eccentric and overlooked historical figure possessed an 
unlikely military skill and, as many historians agree, he was “the greatest soldier Russia 
ever produced.”218 Suvorov’s mind was as sharp as a bayonet, and his original 
observations of the Russian army enabled him to develop a combination of didactic 
principles of great generality and power. 
Not everyone in the West was optimistic or confident about Suvorov’s ability as a 
military commander. Perhaps the most unflattering, even if fallacious, account of the man 
was left by Poet George Gordon Byron, who described him as a “bafoon,” “Momus,”219
and “Harlequin in uniform.”220 After the incredible string of Russian victories against the 
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French in Italy, Emperor Francis sneered that Suvorov’s success was often the result of 
his good fortune and sheer luck. “Great talent is a piece of luck in a military man,” 221
retorted Suvorov.
Modern criticisms have also been harsh. In the words of Gunther Rosenberg, 
Suvorov’s reputation rested on his victories over the poorly 
disciplined and rather backward forces of the Ottoman Empire and 
Poland, and at that was much inflated. His strategy was primitive, 
calling for an attack on the enemy wherever he was found, and his 
tactics, based on the cult of the bayonet, were outdated and wasteful 
when delivered against troops relying on fire.222
Such an approach to and analysis of Suvorov and his model of warfare is flawed,
Jeremy Black argues. It “underrates the problems of campaigning in Eastern Europe and 
mistakenly implies that there is a clear continuum of achievement in military method in 
the light of which it is readily possible to assess what was ‘primitive.’” Black suggests a 
more detailed study of Suvorov’s methods. 
Russian military success has been attributed to…the use of compact 
mobile forces drawing on advanced bases and supply magazines, by 
reliance on storming fortresses rather than on conventional sieges, 
and by a ‘credible offensive formation’: the battlefield use of 
mutually supporting squares, attacking in an articulated fashion and 
benefiting from crossfire.223
Luck and primitivism aside, Russian military methods were built on solid 
theoretical foundations, which were in turn derived from the West. 
A Petite Magnum Opus: Science of Victory 
To assess Russian military performance at the end of the eighteenth century and to 
examine the above claims about Suvorov in critical fashion, Suvorian thought must be 
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oriented in the annals of military-intellectual history. Alexander Suvorov produced the 
most celebrated Russian military classic of the imperial period. The name of this rather 
short document is Nauka pobezhdat’ or Science of Victory (sometimes translated as 
Science of Winning, Science of Conquering or Art of Victory).224 The proper translation of 
the work is imperative, since the appeal to ‘science’ instead of ‘art’ points to the 
influence of Western works that Suvorov read as a young man.
In his last and most famous work, Suvorov established a paradigm that would 
influence the progress and evolution of Russian military theory throughout the nineteenth
century and beyond. It influenced the thinking of Russian officers throughout the second 
half of the nineteenth century, and in 1918 Lenin included parts of this work in the 
training manual for the Red Army.225 In Science of Victory, Suvorov refined “more than 
four decades of experience into a simple set of guidelines to govern the training and 
indoctrination of soldiers in the fundamentals of the military art.”226 Completed in 1796, 
the manual was forgotten soon after its author’s death in 1800. The nineteenth century 
Russian military reformer General Mikhail Dragomirov, who reintroduced the manual 
and Suvorov’s ideas into the mainstream of Russian army, explained the amnesia this 
way: “‘Nauka Pobezhdat’ is composed from folk idioms and other such phrases, this is 
why it was so close to the hearts of Russian soldiers, and did not provoke any interest 
among the highly educated officers of Suvorov’s time.”227
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This is the quintessential difference of Suvorov’s writing, and the one that sets 
this work apart from many of its contemporaries. Notwithstanding its reception in the last 
years of the eighteenth century, Science of Victory greatly enhances the understanding of 
Suvorov’s theory and philosphy of war. Furthermore, it helps to explain how the Russian 
army began to possess the same traits that had distinguished, and in turn made militarily 
sucesssful, the armies of Revolutionary France.228 This is important in light of the major 
themes of this work, namely that Russian military thought arrived independently at the 
same Western military model that ushered in the French Revolution. 
  Science of Victory is divided into two sections: 1. Uchenie razvodnoye, ili pred 
razvodom (Drill Instructions) and 2. Slovesnoye poucheniye soldatam o znanii, dl’ya nih 
neobhodimom (Verbal Instructions). The italicized words within the text symbolize 
commands given by officers, and the words that follow are explanations. The first part of 
Science of Victory is a detailed tactical instruction written for eighteenth century 
battlefield soldiers. Here Suvorov instructs the new recruits how to shoot their muskets, 
how to engage enemy cordon with linear formations, and how to repulse cavalry attacks. 
“Enemy cavalry is galloping to help its infantry. Attack! – Here hold up the bayonets at 
the enemy stomach level; it happens too that the bayonet gets in the muzzle, neck, 
especially in the chest of the horse. – Quick counter attack.”229 He then explained how to 
attack with columns and kares. Suvorov was not a strong proponent of frontal attacks, 
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which in their tactical form required the least effort from the commanders. He preferred 
wide flanking manoeuvres that were more difficult to execute but were strategically more 
rewarding.230 At the time, in the age when tactical evolutions dominated the field of battle
and decided the victor, Suvorov tried to increase the speed of and smooth out the 
complicated reformations from marching columns into lines, from lines into squares, and 
vice versa. In the ‘Comments’ at the end of the first section, Suvorov talked about
fundamentals of proper firing techniques, offensive, and retreat. Suvorov did not allow 
his forces to retreat out of general principles, and in his writings no provisions were made 
for such a manoeuvre. “It is better not even to think about this,” warned the Field 
Marshal. “The influence they [retreats] exert upon a soldier is quite dangerous and 
therefore it is better not even to contemplate this in cavalry and infantry!”231
Suvorov made his greatest contribution to military training theory in the first part 
of the manual. In an age when soldiers’ training was usually confined to parades in the 
capital and drills in the barracks, Suvorov’s approach was both original and daring. He 
began with forced marches. During training, he ordered marches in the most inhospitable 
weather and terrains: over swamps, broken ground and forests, as well as during winter 
snowstorms and summer heat. Suvorov’s objective was to make training conditions 
approach as close as possible the conditions of real combat. To do that, he devised his 
renowned skvoznaia ataka (“through attack” or “transparent attack”).232 It was a 
simulation of real battle, where soldiers were divided into two groups and were ordered 
to commence an attack on each other. They would stop at intervals to fire blank volleys, 
just like in a real engagement, and then continue the advance. When coming closer, the 
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lines launched at each other with a bayonet assault and soldiers were forbidden by their 
officers to slow down. As one contemporary wrote, “this attack was indeed a mess, 
reminiscent of real business of battle. It was conducted by both attacking sides head 
on...amidst infantry and cavalry fire, with screams of Hurrah (Ura!)!” In the meantime, 
the officers on each side were cheering their men on, yelling “Cut them down lads! With 
the bayonets!”233 To sustain the momentum of the exercise and to maintain the martial 
atmosphere of battle, the participants would at the last moment step to the right, raise 
their weapons above their heads and squeeze through the openings in the opposing line, 
hence the name of the exercise. The lines would then be turned around and the attack 
repeated.234
Menning explains that “to approximate the conditions of combat as closely as 
possible, Suvorov often incorporated cavalry and artillery into his ‘attack through’ 
exercises. The crash of blank cannon fire, the drumming of hoofs, the flash of bayonet 
and saber, the din and smoke of mock battle – all injected a heavy dose of realism into 
the exercise.”235 Unsurprisingly, in the turmoil that ensued during such an exercise there 
were injuries and even fatalities, but Suvorov was unconcerned. He once coolly remarked 
that, at the expense of a few lives, he was able to teach and consequently save 
thousands.236 His motto was ‘If you train hard, you will fight easy!’ After the age of 
Napoleonic warfare, especially when bayonet charges had faded away, Drill Instructions
had become largely an archaic piece of tactical directives and in many subsequent 
editions of Suvorov’s book, this highly technical part was omitted.
                                                
    233 Ibid., 33
    234 Ibid., 32-33.
    235 Menning, “Train Hard, Fight Easy: the Legacy of A. V. and His ‘Art of Victory’”.
    236 Ibid.
85
The second part, Verbal Instruction, is more theoretical and as such its usefulness 
transcended the time in which it was written. It also serves as an analytical benchmark for 
passing judgment on Suvorov’s military thought. As far as tactics were concerned, 
Suvorov differentiated between column, line, and square formations, and suggested under 
what circumstances each should be employed. Linear formations should be used against 
regular troops and kares against the Ottomans. “It is possible that a-five-hundred-soldier 
kare would have to tear through a mass of six or seven thousand Turks,”237 he wrote. 
Suvorov’s most interesting commentary, however, concerned the use of columns. 
Suvorov was a keen observer of the political developments in the West and was aware of 
the potential military force that had been released by the French Revolution. He warned 
that one day Russian soldiers might have to confront the French chimera. Listing Russian 
enemies, Suvorov wrote unflatteringly: “There are also the atheist, wind-bag, maddened, 
Frenchies. They war on the Germans with columns. If we will ever fight them, we too 
should use columns.”238 Not even Suvorov could have fathomed the prescience of his
prediction. If anything, Suvorov’s clear understanding of the Revolutionary warfare 
underlined the power of influences that events in the West exercised over Russian 
military mind. Just like his mentor Rumyantsev, Western practices had shaped Suvorov’s 
thought. 
Much like de Saxe and Frederick II before him, Suvorov supplied his readers with 
several essential military arts (voinskii iskusstva), one innate and two acquired, which 
according to him determined the fate of military campaigns. The first art was glazomer. 
No equivalent word exists in English, but in French, the Russian word closely 
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corresponds to coup d’oeil. In the words of Suvorov it denoted the ability to seize and 
comprehend the situation on the ground quickly. It meant the knowledge of setting up 
camps, conducting marches, and developing attacks.239 Suvorov probably borrowed this 
concept from Frederick, who wrote in his Instructions that “the coup d’oeil of a general is 
the talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the 
terrain and the use that they can make of it with their army.”240
Bystrota or speed was the second art.241 Suvorov outlined, in a very meticulous 
way, his approach to successful logistics. Suvorian marches became legendary even 
during his lifetime, and the speed of movement enabled him to be at the right place at the 
right time and take the enemy by surprise. In the winter of 1768, during the war with 
Poland, his Suzdal regiment of 1,500 men marched almost 500 miles in seventeen days -
or 29.4 miles a day.242 In May 1789, during the war with the Turks, Suvorov had to link 
with his Austrian ally, Prince Couburg, and Suvorov’s division covered forty miles in 
twenty-eight hours.243 Later that year, Suvorov had another occasion to come to the 
assistance of the Austrian corps that faced the whole Ottoman army. Suvorov moved out 
at midnight of September 8. As Potemkin wrote to Catherine on September 10: 
The order given by me to the commanders of the corps [i.e. Prince 
Couburg] to go where the enemy has concentrated, is why general 
Suvorov is currently underway to help them, but for him to reach 
[Couburg] at the mentioned time is impossible.244
At 10 am, the same day that Potemkin’s report was dispatched, Suvorov’s tired division 
reached the Austrian camp. Suvorov defied the expectations of his commander and as 
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Longworth calculated, it took the Russian forces to cover sixty miles of some of the most 
difficult terrain in Europe thirty-six hours.245 Eventually, Suvorov grew to take bystrota 
to the extreme. For example, in Italy in the summer heat of 1799, his marches were too 
excruciating even for the seasoned Russian troops. The forced march to the Trebbia river 
to cut off the French General Macdonald lost all the resemblance of orderly eighteenth 
century formations – the soldiers ran in disorganized groups as fast as they could, many 
collapsing from exhaustion never to get up again. As one soldier testified, “a terrible trail 
marked the passage of the [Russian] army.” 246
The third and last principle of Suvorov’s military art was natisk or impetus of 
offensive operations.247 For Suvorov a step back or a retreat was equal to death. The word 
‘retreat’ does not appear once in the whole of Science of Victory. All of his operations 
were by design, nature, and purpose offensive. Suvorov developed his three military arts 
as the means by which a strategic goal of the field army could be achieved. For Suvorov 
this meant crushing the enemy on the battlefield and then chasing after him to achieve 
complete annihilation. A clear continuity and influence of Rumyantsev’s thought is 
unmistakable.
Another trait that Suvorov has inherited from Rumyantsev was the highly visible 
humanism and an obsession with cleanliness and health. In Science of Victory, Suvorov 
spilled much ink writing about hospitals and the welfare of the troops. Suvorov preferred 
folk remedies such as herbs, roots, clean water, and fresh air. He warned his soldiers, 
“Beware of hospitals! German drugs are from far away, expired, useless and dangerous. 
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The Russian soldier is not used to them! You have in the artels248, roots, grasses…Stay 
healthy!”249 He also imposed fines for soldiers who did not take proper care of 
themselves, reinforcing the universal values of the Enlightenment philosophy that was 
concerned with the preservation of human dignity and life. 
Far from the blood-thirsty beast that the Western newspapers portrayed, Suvorov 
always maintained that the surrendered should be given quarter. “It is a sin to kill 
indiscriminately, they are human beings too,”250 wrote Suvorov of his enemies. He 
remained true to this principle to the very end of his life. In 1799, before engaging 
General Macdonald on the banks of Trebbia, he wrote a prikaz (an order) to the Cossacks 
on how to engage the French:
1. The enemy army take prisoner (vzyat’ v polon). 
2. Cossacks shall bayonet; but should listen carefully if the French 
will scream ‘pardon’251 or ‘shamade.’ [sic] While attacking, the 
Cossacks should yell ‘balezarm, pardon, zhette lezarm’252 and after 
this the cavalry should brutally attack, and descend upon the batteries 
to drive home the attack.
3. …With the prisoners be kind… As far as the French Generals [and 
officers] are concerned… shout ‘Pardon’ and if they do not surrender 
cut them down.253
Similar orders run through all of Suvorov’s correspondence, which indicates a clear and 
conscious effort to impose some rules upon the irrationality of war.
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In the Science of Victory, Suvorov also wrote about civil-military relations. He 
declared “Do not harm civilians: they provide us with food and water. A soldier is not a 
bandit.”254 With such words the old man instilled honour into the profession of soldiery 
and gave clear guidelines governing the interaction between military and society. 
Unfortunately, Suvorov had a hard time enforcing this part of his teachings in practice. 
Soldiers gave little heed to such stipulations in the heat of battle. At the same time, it is 
doubtful that the highly pious Suvorov would openly suggest threatening to cut the 
throats of hostage women and children, as Frederick had suggested in his instructions for 
his generals in 1747.
Perhaps Suvorov’s most influential contribution to Russian military theory was 
his advocacy of bayonet tactics, another theme that runs visibly through all of his orders, 
letters, and works. Suvorov’s idioms such as “Shoot rarely, but deadly, with the bayonet 
stab firmly,” later became part of the military lexicon. Suvorov’s best-known catch 
phrase was “The bullet is a fool, but the bayonet is a fine chap!” (Pulia dura, a shtik 
molodez!). 255 It was more than just a tactical maxim for an eighteenth century 
infantryman. The aphorism denoted a particular aspect of the Russian military psyche. 
With this crude phrase, Suvorov was able to drive a clear wedge between the human and 
technological elements in war. His obvious implication was that the human or moral 
element, represented by the bayonet and the hand that wields it, triumphs over its 
material, or technological counterpart, the bullet. Moreover, with his brilliant victories
won at the tip of bayonet charges, Suvorov could prove the dominance of the human 
element on the battlefield. 
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Even though he mostly fought against non-Western armies, this was enough to 
demonstrate the accuracy of his conviction. The superiority of the Russian morale and the 
ability of soldiers to endure hardships carried the day, he believed. In the age of 
smoothbore, muzzle-loading muskets, the effect of the bullet was only relative, and its 
accuracy decreased significantly with range. Against this background, despite the danger 
of proximity associated with the use of cold weapons, the bayonet was very practical, 
since it was more deadly, cheaper, easier and faster to use than muskets that took time to 
load and fire. Wrote Suvorov: “Three attack you – bayonet the first, shoot the second, 
stab the third!”256 There was a psychological factor. As Menning notes, “Victory in battle 
ultimately represents a triumph of will, and there is no better way to demonstrate outright 
mastery than to dominate physically with cold steel.”257 Facing hundreds of rapidly 
approaching, glittering, razor sharp bayonets is nerve-racking, which Suvorov 
understood. From Turkish janissaries at Rymnik to French infantry at Trebbia, Russian 
bayonet charges undermined the morale and broke the will of opposing forces.
Even though it was an original approach and one that suited the socio-economic 
character of the Russian armies, the trend to rely on the bayonet and the disillusionment 
with the firearms had already been expressed by French authors. Years before Suvorov, 
de Saxe wrote that “the abuse of firing began to be appreciated; it causes more noise than 
harm, and those who depend on it are always beaten.”258 The only new element in
Suvorov’s thought was the degree of fanatical trust that he placed in cold weapons.259
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Connected to the use of the bayonet was the theme of training and drill that can be 
seen throughout Science of Victory. In fact, Suvorov is remembered best as a military 
pedagogue, because his approach to that branch of military art was pioneering. “For 
Suvorov, training began with the individual soldier,” writes Menning. “The task was to 
transform annual levies of raw and illiterate peasant conscripts into fighting troops.” 
Suvorov always worked from the bottom up. Furthermore, he made officers take direct 
interest and initiative in and responsibility for the training of their soldiers.260 In other 
words, Suvorov occupied himself with the question of how to turn an apathetic Russian 
serf into a military specialist without making him into a Prussian-style automaton, while 
injecting him with motivation and patriotic fervour that could match the nationalistic 
brewery of the revolutionary France.
To cultivate the dedication of the Russian serfs to the profession of soldiering was 
not an easy task. Unlike France, Russia in the 1790s did not witness the bourgeoning of 
nationalism as a distinct and independed ideology. Suvorov did not know what 
nationalism meant, and to him the events unfolding in France seemed ghastly unpatriotic. 
Yet subconsciously he strove to replicate the effects of nationalism in his soldiers. 
Suvorov’s goal was to make his serf-recruits believe in their own abilites, in their moral 
superiority over enemies, and to nurture a spirit of invincibility. As Menning writes, “his 
methods developed men confident in their own capacities and abilities to succeed, even 
under most trying condition of battle.” Suvorov wanted his soldiers to project to the 
enemy “a sense of self-contained control, a sense of disciplined will power that led 
inevitably to victory.”261 To achieve this, Suvorv appealed to the two main pillars of 
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monarchical state that were readily accessible to him and his soldiers. In order to generate 
the same military responsiveness from the Russian soldiers as Republican France was 
able to extract from its citizenry, the Russian Field Marshall turned to religion and the 
institution of Tsardom. 
Suvorov was a deeply religious man. He composed a cannon of  nine songs262 and 
even crafted a wooden cross for the church of St. Peter and Paul in Ladoga.263 He 
recognized and reinforced religious and patriotic sentiments and tried to awaken them in 
his recruits to strengthen “common identity and loyalty to shared values.”264 As Best 
writes, “Suvorov took [religion] to such a heady pitch”265 that it almost served as 
brainwashing mechanism. Suvorov wrote to his soldiers: “Pray to God! He delivers us 
victory. Wonder-heroes! God is our general!”266 The soldiers should die for “Virgin 
Mary, (bogorodiza), for the mother, for the Holy Kingdom of God! (presvetleyshey 
dom)”267 One would be at a loss to find a similar referene of religious devotion in 
Western military writings. 
Suvorov never bothered to explain the political reasons for war to his troops, but 
chose to present the wars and campaigns in the cloak of religious self-righteousness. It 
was the easiest way to ignite a fire of comradery in Russian armies while at the same time 
intensifying the patriotic feelings of individual soldiers. On the way to the Italian front in 
1799, Suvorov stopped in Mittau (modern day Jelgava, Latvia) to meet with French 
political exile, Louis XVIII, and received his royal blessings for the upcoming campaign. 
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As Longworth puts it: “This occasion set the final seal of authority on what was seen as a 
modern crusade.”268
Reflecting about the nature of his profession to his beloved daughter, Natasha, 
Suvorov wrote: “I am her [Catherine II’s] soldier, I die for my Motherland (otechistvo). 
The higher I am advanced by her graces, the happier I am to sacrifice myself for 
her…God has prolonged my life for the service to the state.”269 Suvorov projected his 
child-like and blind adoration and devotion to the Russian monarchy onto his soldiers. 
From the first day that recruits were torn away from their families, they were subjected to 
constant bombardment of slogans, aphorism, and catch-phrases, until they were 
conditioned for most suicidal missions and were ready to spring to defence of the 
Tsardom. An appeal to the Russian patriotism to make the troops labour harder, by 
referring to ‘Empress Mother Catherine,’ always worked.270 By the time his army was 
about to enter Italy, Suvorov had largely attained his objective of  fusing religious pietism 
with indomitable devotion to institutional autocracy. This produced a patriotic mixture 
powerful enough to withstand the shock of the latest evocation of European military 
thought. 
It seems that Suvorov was slowly drifting in the same direction as Guibert when 
he proposed the creation of military bodies tied together by the bonds of nationalism in 
their service to the state. Guibert proposed national participation in warfare, but this 
directly contradicted the esblished political order of the ancient régime. Suvorov tried to 
maintain the idea of Guibert alive with notions acceptable under the absolutism of the 
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Imperial Russia. He was trying to solve this contradiction by substituting liberté, egalité, 
fraternité with his religious, paternalistic, and patriotic propaganda. 
Finally, the stylistic contrast between Suvorov’s Nauka Pobezhdat’ and 
Rumyantsev’s Mysl’ is striking. Here is how Suvorov described the strorming of a 
fortress should proceed:
Break through the abatis271, throw down your hurdles over the wolf 
traps272! Run, fast! Hop over the palisades273, throw down your 
fascines274, go down into the ditch, put up ladders! Marksmen, cover 
the columns, aim for the heads! Columns, fly over the walls to the 
parapets, bayonet! On the parapet form a line! Guard the powder 
cellars! Open the gates for the cavalry! The enemy runs into the city 
– turn his cannons against him! Hit him hard, lively bombardment! 
Don’t do it for too long. The order is given – get down into the city, 
cut down the enemy in the streets! Cavalry, charge! Don’t enter the 
houses, hit them on the streets! Storm where the foe has hidden! 
Occupy city square, put up guards. Put up pickets immediately, by 
the gates, callers and magazines! The enemy has surrendered – give 
him mercy! The walls are ours – now to the loot!275
Suvorov’s “writings are as different from the common run of classical prose as his tactics 
were from those of Frederick or Marlborough,”276 wrote  Prince Dmitry Mirsky in the 
1920s.  The short sentences reflect the brisk mind of their author and the fast pace of 
battle. The passivity of a typical military manual was replaced with an active present 
tense. The language was calculated to be accessible not only to the officers, but also to 
the regular soldiers. As one of Suvorov’s biographers claims, Science of Victory “is the 
first known written record on the art of war intended not only for officers but for every 
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serving man.”277 He used familiar folk idioms to drive home his message, such as 
“Ignorance is darkness – knowledge is light!,” and compared the craft of war to the 
peasants toliling their fields. The metaphor was effective and relatable.
There was also a hidden psychological undertone throughout the text. In Science 
of Victory, Suvorov used a terminology that allowed him to extract incredible physical 
and mental efforts from his soldiers. The troops were never supposed to concentrate on 
the difficulties of their tasks, because they were made easy by the author. In Suvorian 
terminology, soldiers were called bogatyri or wonder-heroes. The heavy infantry 
backpack was called “the wind” (veter’); regiments did not move out from their camp, 
but “jumped up, put on their winds, and ran forward”; the ditch was never “too deep”, 
and the parapet was never “too high”;278 the columns “flew” over the walls, and soldiers 
“hopped” over the parapets. These clever linguistic formulations blew a cool breeze of 
simplicity and excitement over the dangers of battle. Suvorov cleverly detached his text 
from the hardships of military life. 
Suvorov’s aim was to get close to the soldier’s heart and learn its beat. According 
to many of his contemporaries, he succeeded in doing just that. “Weapons and warfare 
may evolve, but the hands which wield the weapons and the heart which directs the hands 
will always remain the same,” wrote Dragomirov. Therefore, Nauka pobezhdat’ “belongs 
to those works of literature that may become obsolete in form but in spirit and relevance 
will remain forever young.”279
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Assessing Suvorov’s Theories
Suvorian battles were bloody, exhausting, and costly in human life, but they were 
decisive. His soldiers were well trained and taken care of, and fought with dedication 
only matched by the citizens of the French Republic. Suvorov was convinced that the 
shortest way to end a conflict was through a decisive battle and here no sacrifice was too 
great. 
At the heart of the Suvorov’s ideas was the Russian serf-soldier who was 
transformed by Suvorian training into the sturdy “wonder-hero.” Suvorov invested 
heavily into the training of the recruits, as his Nauka pobezhdat’ clearly shows. He 
wanted the Russian army to believe in itself, and to inculcate the idea that everything it 
set out to do was within the intellectual capacity of its officers and within physical grasp 
of the soldiers. When morale faltered, Suvorov did everything in his power to raise it. At 
Kinburn and at Trebbia the old man inspired the troops by personal example. The Field 
Marshal always maintained that it is the people, not guns, who win wars. Therefore, he 
always took good care of his human capital, providing his soldiers with good food, 
reliable medical services, and improved barracks. 
The main principles of Suvorian model can be formulated in the following terms: 
1. A decisive and powerful attack using a combination of 
column, linear, or square formations employing all 
branches of forces at one’s disposal.
2. Constancy in maintaining of the initiative. 
3. The culmination of battle is an energetic pursuit of the 
enemy, with the goal of destroying the human capital of the 
enemy forces.
4. Presence of strong humanitarian trends that defined the 
conduct of soldiers towards civilians and prisoners. 
5. Strong emphasis on personal hygiene.
6. The use of religion and patriotism as tools for unity and 
motivation.
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The success of Suvorian methods, which were effective regardless of military 
circumstances, must be above all measured against the progressive military system that 
emerged in France at the end of the eighteenth century. Instead of well-disciplined linear 
formations used by the armies of the ancient régime, “the French learned to break up 
quickly, reforming in columns so as to concentrate large numbers of troops in a single 
area of battlefield.”280 Out of necessity, the French Revolution introduced new methods 
of warfare. “The political Revolution in France had caused a military revolution and, 
indeed, was dependent on the latter for its survival,” writes Jeremy Black.281 The old 
tactics associated with “cautious dilatoriness” were discarded in favour of offensive 
action. The French cared little about flanks, economizing the lives of their soldiers, or 
their lines of communications. They always went forward with “undaunted valour” even 
when hungry, tired, or out of ammunition.282 All they cared about was breaking the 
enemy lines or outflanking him, and they were always eager to give battle. In addition, 
war was very dear to the hearts and minds of the French people who filled the ranks, 
because it threatened the very survival of something they themselves had helped to create 
- the republic. Thus, the French levies fought with unprecedented enthusiasm. No wonder 
that one after another, Prussian, Italian, Austrian and English armies, who relied on more 
traditional ways of conducting battle, and whose soldiers were blunt and unmotivated 
tools of dynastic politics, were defeated.283 Europe had no particular strategy in either 
theory or practice to counter the mobility that the French generals had created. As one 
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Russian historian sums it up: “Only one other system possessed the same vigour and 
elasticity: the system of Suvorov.”284
The question of a ‘military system’ or a model, in this case Suvorian, looms large 
over the analytical horizon. The thesis of national military schools that began with 
Rumyantsev had also been applied to the work of Suvorov. Many commentators have 
claimed that Suvorov was a progenitor of a truly Russian model of warfare that was both 
different and superior to the Western standards. Hew Strachan, for instance, sees Suvorov 
as “the father figure of Russian military thought.” According to him, Suvorov “spurned 
the emerging independent Russian military tradition, which traces itself from Suvorov 
through Rumyantsev back to Peter the Great.”285 The underlying theme of this study 
hopes to challenge the above interpretations of Russian military thought in the eighteenth 
century, and re-examine views that cause distortion or error by extreme simplification of 
the subject.  Strachan’s analysis, like many others, stumbles into two pitfalls: one is 
related to the scope of military thoughts and the political freedom of their practitioners
and the other speaks to the misinterpretation surrounding the military activity of Peter the 
Great. 
First, Suvorov was a divisional or corps commander until he was in his late 
sixties, and his military activities were always circumvented. As Longworth correctly 
points out, “Suvorov never had an opportunity for the free exercise of his strategic 
judgment.”286 Unlike Rumyantsev, who was a governor of Ukraine and a commander of 
an army (and thus had to look beyond the field tactics), Suvorov’s strategic thought never 
evolved past tactical objectives. He never enjoyed the kind of authority that would have 
                                                
    284 Ibid.
    285 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 56.
    286 Longworth, 310.
99
enabled a merger of his ideas with political prerogatives. Therefore, Suvorov was trapped 
in matters relating to training, tactics, and troop management. He never had an 
opportunity to plan a campaign, and even in 1799, when he was the nominal commander-
in-chief, his actions were constrained by the Viennese court. As such, his military 
deliberations lacked the broad scope of a strategic mind, and were, in turn, too narrow to 
cast him as a father of Russian military thought. Suvorov was perhaps the father-figure 
for the Russian soldiers, but not of the intellectual trends that defined Russian responses
to war. As this study has illustrated, that place has to be reserved for Rumyantsev.
The second misconception that Strachan has perpetuated is closely related to the 
Russian military development at the beginning of the 18th century. As many Soviet 
historians before him, Strachan drew a straight line over a very uneven intellectual 
surface, from Suvorov in 1800 back to Peter the Great in 1700. As the first chapter 
explained, Peter the Great was the founder of Western traditions in the Russian Imperial 
state. Moreover, he eagerly transplanted military style from the West. He introduced a 
table of ranks, re-designed the Russian uniforms to the point where they became 
distinguishable from the West only by their color, and imported Western firearms into his 
army. He held councils of war, injected German, English and French words into the 
Russian military lingo, and established Western-style ministry of war. Among many 
misleading metaphorical constructs is the famous expression by Kersnovsky: “Never yet 
has the Russian military art stood as high as at the end of the eighteenth century. The plan 
for its mighty structure was drawn up by Peter, the foundation had been laid down by 
Rumyantsev, the building itself has been raised to the skies by the great Suvorov.”287 If 
Peter I was an ardent Westernizer, the blueprint for the Russian army was already laid to 
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mimic the military culture of the West. Does the layout of the foundation not define the 
architecture of the house?   
That Alexander Suvorov was preoccupied with the study of tactics rather than 
strategy, and troop management instead of politics, should not belittle the intellectual 
magnitude of his ideas. Methodological misconceptions aside, the question remains 
whether Suvorov’s thought was autochthonous or simply a variation on themes 
developed in the West. Humanism, training, discipline, bayonet, religion and superficial 
patriotism (not to be confused with nationalism as understood today) came together in the 
Suvorian model. He understood that the demands of the Russian army were different 
from the West, but at the same time his core ideas, and more importantly his goals and 
the end product of his military synthesis, were curiously Western. On close inspection 
many of the elements of Suvorov’s model were if not explicitly borrowed from, then 
definitely formed by, practices in the West. Suvorov’s ideas about the bayonet 
suspiciously resembled theories developed by Folard. The need to study the heart of the 
soldier also made its appearance in de Saxe’s Reveries.
Much also had been ascribed to Suvorov’s insistence of developing initiative in 
lower ranks. His insistence on individual fire often comes up in Soviet scholarship to 
justify this claim. De Saxe had already proposed that officers should only show the 
soldier “where to direct his fire, allowing him to fire at will, that is when he has found a 
target.”288 The major differences between the Suvorian thought and that of the West 
related to his rejection of the geometric science of tactics and strategy. Suvorov saw no 
need for carefully calculated angles of von Bülow. Unlike Henry Lloyd, who saw the 
army as a machine, Suvorov conceptualized it as an organic being. 
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Without robbing Suvorov of the credit for composing a text that defined the 
theoretical and tactical development of Russia’s armed forces for the next century, it is 
important to note that even though Nauka Pobezhdat’ was an original piece of work, its 
message was not original. Suvorov borrowed many of the themes found in Science of 
Victory from the West. His devotion to developing professionalism in officers, and the 
drive to nurture the three I’s (initiative, intelligence, and independence) in soldiers, was 
already evident in earlier Western military works. Suvorov’s greatest intellectual 
contribution was the synthesis of complex ideas found in works of thinkers like 
Rumyantsev, and digesting them so that they could be disseminated in terms 
comprehensible to the simple mind of the Russian recruit. In this task Suvorov soared 
above other Russian and European military theorists, even though he relied heavily on 
their ideas. 
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A F T E RT H O U G H T S
“The object of war is victory; 
that of victory is conquest; 
and that of conquest preservation.”
De l'esprit des lois, 1748
Charles de Montesquieu
As Hans Rogger remarked in his doctoral dissertation, “the single most important fact of 
Russian history in the 18th century remains the unprecedented receptivity to all that came 
from the West.”289 This openness of Russian mind extended above all to the realm of 
military ideas that helped fashion an Eastern power into a major player in European 
politics. This development extrapolated the political dictums of a philosophical mind that 
came to dominate the intellectual scene of Europe. Accordingly, Russian military thought 
in the second half of the eighteenth century joined the chorus of other writings about war 
in fulfilling the logical, linear progression succinctly and eloquently evoked in 
Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of the Laws. Like any empire, Russia fought for the laurels 
of victory, but it never lost sight of the fact that victory was merely a prerequisite military 
function of geographic conquest, which translated into political annexation. Annexation 
served to quench the thirst of the imperial bureaucracy for natural resources and taxable 
subjects who in a circular motion fuelled the engines of imperialism. Russia’s existence, 
or in Montesquieu’s words ‘preservation,’ depended on this cycle. Its military thought 
became the guardian of this process.
There are several uncomfortable contradictions that emerge both within the 
scholarship about Russian eighteenth century military-intellectual developments and 
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within the developments themselves. While Soviet/Russian scholarship has insisted that 
this period served as conduit for the growth of distinctly Russian and superior style of 
war, careful analysis of primary sources points to the contrary. Moreover, incongruence 
within Russian military thought itself is even more daunting. 
The trans-cultural transfer of military ideas between Russia and the West is clear 
enough to undermine the claims of Russian scholarship. Large portions of thought that 
were found in the Russian body of writings were clearly present in those of Western
theorists, and often at earlier times. This inevitably points to a congruence not only of 
military practices but also of models of thought. Differences inevitably existed between 
the Russian and Western approaches to the practice of military craft, which is 
understandable given that the wars with the Turks did much to define Russian 
idiosyncrasies. For instance, Rumyantsev challenged the established norms when he 
broke away from the cordon, but his departure from them did not change the face of 
battle beyond recognition. Finally, in the twilight of the eighteenth century, Suvorov, the 
last major military writer of his time, was slowly devising a mechanism to nationalize the 
Russian army without ideological preconditions. French nationalism was mirrored by 
Russian patriotism that manifested itself in the blind allegiance to the double-headed 
eagle of the Romanov house and the three-bar Orthodox cross. While the French had a 
Republic, the Russians had a motherland. Even though the two were politically and 
philosophically different conceptual entities, they still served the same purpose of societal 
unification behind the objectives of military struggle. Suvorov’s thoughts were original 
but not indicative of a new military system. Neither he nor Rumyantsev have been 
iconoclastic enough to usher in a decisively different way of thinking about or conducting 
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war. In retrospect, the final verdict should rest upon the assumption that those differences 
were not enough to render Russian fundamentally distinct from the Western way of war. 
Russian thought, and to a lesser extent its army, still represented an extension of Western 
values, practices, and thoughts. 
The contradictions within Russian thought itself are not as easily reconciled. It is 
beyond the capacity of this work to explain the origins of certain intellectual patterns of 
Russian thought in the eighteenth century. That is a job of a significantly more in-depth 
and lengthy study. What can be done here is to put the ideas of Russian thought into 
perspective, and outline some peculiar paradoxes. To begin, the two main agents of 
Russian thought were acting army commanders with significant military and political 
responsibilities, a luxury that many Western theorists like Lloyd or von Bülow did not 
enjoy. The vocation of the Russian thinkers could account for why Russian military 
thought at that time was less philosophical, lacking any serious deliberation on whether 
war is an art or a science, and why it was inherently more political than Western thought. 
Curious also is the total absence of an attempt to create a new system of warfare. That 
Russian thinkers did not search for a universal theory of war – the preoccupation of many 
Western minds – is equally puzzling. 
There were also theoretical disagreements between Rumyantsev and Suvorov. For 
instance, while the former advocated the construction of hospitals, the latter advised his 
soldiers to avoid them altogether. Another contradiction is found in the highly visible 
humanism of Russian thought. Even though Suvorov and Rumyantsev attempted to 
improve the physical conditions of Russian soldiers by making their life in the army more 
endurable, they had no scruples sacrificing the fruits of their training. Suvorov, who 
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valued human life in principle, pushed his soldiers to the brink of death from physical 
exhaustion from battles or his deadly exercises. 
So what is historians’ verdict on eighteenth century military thought? As Martin 
Creveld has stated, while eighteenth century theoreticians had interesting things to say,
their contribution to the modern warfare is remote, and their writings had little that 
“foreshadows the future.”290 The question of denouement of relevance of bygone eras is 
an important one, as has been attested by both Jeremy Black291 and William Odom.292
More particular to the Russian case, Walter Pinter writes that “Russia produced no 
strategic thinkers whose work has had more than a temporary impact.” He assures his 
readers: “There were not Russian Mahans, Clausewitzes, or Jominis…”293
This brings the present work to its final inquiry: what can be extracted from the 
saga of a Russian eighteenth century military mind? What principles of Rumyantsev’s 
thought or parts of the Suvoroian model, if any, can be used in or applied to modern 
warfare? Have the ideas espoused by the Russian military theorists in the eighteenth 
century lost their relevance over time? Is there a place for them in modern military craft 
or do they deserve, in the early 21st century, to be relegated to ‘the dustbin of history’?
It is obvious that modern warfare has evolved into a completely different beast 
from the time of Rumyantsev and Suvorov. The complexity of modern combat, the 
involvement of a great number of high-tech and mechanical equipment, the use of air 
power and missile systems, and satellites have changed the approaches to solving 
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questions related to tactics, strategy, organization and command and control in war. As 
Baiov argues, however, “it is important to understand that first and foremost, the changes 
that had taken place in warfare since Suvorov are of a material nature, which always play 
a secondary role on the battlefield when compared to the dominant human element.”294
In contemporary wars, there is a tendency, especially in Western armies, to place 
primary emphasis on technology and give soldiers a secondary role in combat. This 
became the essence of the so called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). RMA has 
been viewed as “technical Rubicon across which lies a world where warfare has been 
transformed by science and an unprecedented capability to know everything.”295 This 
notion has become particularly engrained into the American military establishment, 
reflected in doctrine that sees warfare as fundamentally transformed by “the innovative 
application of technology.”296 As conflicts from Vietnam and Afghanistan to modern Iraq 
have demonstrated, the human spirit remains a major factor in achieving victory. Mighty 
nations with advanced equipment were often at pains to subdue lesser states with more 
resolute fighters. Morale, unity and the inner fortitude of warriors remain critical 
variables in determining victory of defeat in combat. 
Baiov insists that no matter how advanced the weapons are, or how effective they 
will become, they will never be able to replace the functions performed by a soldier. He 
emphasizes that the soldier, or the human element, is the main weapon and catalyst of 
war.297 To win a battle one must study human nature, not the nature of a gun. Suvorov 
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realized the advantage of the human element and the importance of morale over 
technological innovations. The high spirit, iron resolve, and stubbornness of his soldiers 
proved to be more potent than a hundred musket volleys. Therefore, at least on a
conjectural level, lessons of the past remain relevant to the present and, in the words of 
Bruce Menning, “the classics are always modern.”298
Eighteenth century Russian thinking concerning war was neither primitive nor 
abstract, and forces historians to reconsider the hastily pronounced verdict of Frederick 
the Great and his contemporaries about the barbarians from the East. The writings of 
Rumyantsev and Suvorov undermine Western claims of Russian military backwardness, 
as well as Soviet/Russian claims of a unique theory of warfare. Instead, these important
texts speak to the intellectual sophistication and suspiring degree of awareness of 
Western military trends and their subsequent influences on early Russian imperial 
military thought. 
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